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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether compliance with the UK 
Stewardship Code (the Code) by institutional investors 
influences their investee companies’ earnings quality. The 
Code sets out the principles of effective stewardship for 
UK institutional investors, and aims to encourage them to 
better exercise governance responsibilities toward 
investee companies. This thesis tests whether Code 
compliance strengthens the relation between investment 
duration and size and earnings quality. The findings show 
no significant evidence indicating that Code compliance 
enhances investee companies’ earnings quality. The study 
also presents content analysis of compliance disclosure 
and an index is developed of Code compliance quality. 
Subsequent analysis allowing for variation in Code 
compliance quality still fails to indicate any significant 
relation with reported earnings quality. 
This study is one of the first attempts to test the 
effectiveness of the UK Stewardship Code. It provides 
valuable insights regarding the policy approach that 
underpins the Code as a method of improving corporate 
governance and provides a reference for further revision 
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and development of the Code by policymakers.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
This study examines the impact of the UK 
Stewardship Code (hereafter ‘the Code’), a code of 
governance applicable to institutional investors with an 
equity holding in UK listed companies, based on the 
earnings quality of their investee companies. First 
published in 2010, and updated in 2012, the aim of the 
Code is to enhance the quality of engagement between 
asset managers and companies to help improve long-term 
risk-adjusted returns to shareholders (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012).   
The Code was developed by the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) in response to a call for 
institutional investors to take a more active role in the 
corporate governance of their investee companies. The 
passiveness of institutional investors was perceived as a 
major shortcoming of the UK system (Goergen et al., 
2008).  The Code aims to provide guidance that enhances 
the quality of dialogue between investors and their 
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investee companies, and facilitates the exercise of good 
governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). 
Arsalidou (2012, p343) comments that the UK 
Stewardship Code ‘is an important attempt to redress the 
balance in the corporate governance matrix…’ and that 
‘the Code is the first of its type in the world’. 
The development of a ‘Stewardship Code’ for 
institutional investors is part of a worldwide response to 
high profile corporate failures in recent decades, which 
have been attributed in part to poor corporate governance. 
Many countries have published Codes of Corporate 
Governance for publicly listed companies. The Index of 
Codes published by the European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI, 2014), shows that over sixty countries 
have developed corporate governance guidelines. 
However, the UK was the first to develop a code of 
governance specifically for institutional investors. 
Following their lead, only Japan has since adopted this 
approach with the release in 2014 of the ‘Principles for 
Responsible Institutional Investors’. 
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1.2 The UK Stewardship Code 
Institutional investors were first acknowledged as 
having stewardship responsibilities for their investee 
companies in the 1992 Cadbury Report, which contained 
brief recommendations on their governance role. 
Subsequently, the Greenbury Report (1995) and the 
Hampel Report (1998) included recommendations for 
institutional investors regarding their disclosure, 
engagement and monitoring functions. The resulting 
general UK Governance Codes of 1998 and 2003 only 
included recommendations for institutional investors to 
maintain a dialogue with the boards of investee 
companies.  
The origins of the UK Stewardship Code, which is 
specifically for institutional investors, can be traced to 
2002 when the Institutional Shareholders Committee 
(ISC) published ‘The Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents: Statement of Principles’. This 
document was a response to the call for institutional 
investors to take an active role in the corporate 
governance of investee companies. The Statement of 
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Principles was later adopted and converted to a code by 
the ISC in 2009. Later in the same year, the Walker 
Review of governance in financial institutions invited the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to take responsibility 
for the converted code that went on to become the first 
version of the UK Stewardship Code and was published 
in 2010 (and then updated in 2012). The principal aim of 
the Code is to ‘enhance the quality of engagement 
between asset managers and companies to help improve 
long-term risk-adjusted returns to shareholders’ 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2012). The Code provides 
guidance for institutional investors on enhancing the 
quality of dialogue with investee companies and to 
facilitate their exercise of effective and responsible 
governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2012).  
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1.2.1 The UK Stewardship Code Principles 
The Code adopted by the Financial Reporting 
Council classifies institutional investors as asset owners, 
including such frameworks as pension funds, insurance 
companies, investment trusts and other collective 
investment vehicles. The Code states that it aims to assist 
institutional investors to better exercise their stewardship 
activities including ‘monitoring and engaging with 
companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, 
capital structure, and corporate governance’ (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012). Recognising that not all the 
principles contained in the code will necessarily be 
applicable, the Code operates on a voluntary ‘comply or 
explain’ model. It outlines an expectation that 
institutional investors will disclose their level of 
compliance via a statement of compliance on their 
website, or disclose reasons why they are not compliant. 
The Code consists of seven guiding principles on how 
institutional investors should exercise their stewardship 
responsibilities. These include disclosure of their 
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activities, managing conflicts of interest, monitoring and 
engagement with investee companies. The principles are: 
1. Publicly disclose their policy on how they will 
discharge their stewardship responsibilities. 
2. Have a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest in relation to stewardship, which 
should be publicly disclosed. 
3. Monitor their investee companies. 
4. Establish clear guidelines on when and how 
they will escalate their stewardship activities. 
5. Be willing to act collectively with other 
investors where appropriate. 
6. Have a clear policy on voting and disclosure 
of voting activity. 
7. Report periodically on their stewardship and 
voting activities. 
These principles are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
2. 
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 1.3 Institutional investors’ role in corporate governance 
Monks and Minow (1995) refer to three main 
pillars of governance: the shareholders, management (led 
by the CEO), and the board of directors. Institutional 
investors are a sub-group of the first category (Stapledon, 
1995), and their role in corporate governance has drawn 
increasing attention given their capacity as significant 
shareholders to influence the board. The role of 
institutional investors has been contentious. Gillan and 
Starks (2000) argue that institutional investors have 
abandoned their traditional passive approach in 
governance of investee companies for a more active role. 
In contrast, Koh (2003) called for institutional investors 
to play a more influential role in governance of their 
portfolio firms, and suggested the removal of legal 
barriers, such as legal and political restraints on control 
and ownership of quoted companies, which prevent 
institutional investors from involvement in corporate 
governance (Stapledon, 1996).  
It is recognized that strong corporate governance 
structures are needed to mitigate the ‘agency’ problem 
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that arises due to the separation of ownership and control 
in corporations. This study uses agency theory as the 
theoretical framework to explain the benefit of having a 
governance mechanism such as the UK Stewardship 
Code. From an agency perspective, effective governance 
provides monitoring of managers to protect shareholders 
by mitigating opportunistic behavior and related agency 
costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). This study argues that institutional investors who 
comply with the Code may impact the quality of earnings 
of UK listed companies through more effective 
monitoring.  
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1.4 Institutional investors and earnings quality 
Agency theory is the basis for the explaining why 
institutional investors influence earnings quality in the 
context the separation of ownership from management in 
modern corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory analysis suggests that managers are 
motivated by self-interest and work to make personal 
gain which can be in conflict with the interests of 
shareholders. Managers have personal incentives to 
manage reported earnings. For example, they may 
manipulate earnings to meet or beat earnings targets in 
order to be rewarded with bonus payments that are tied to 
accounting performance (Healy, 1985). Monitoring of 
managers by shareholders or their representatives can 
mitigate earnings manipulation (Almazan et al., 2005). 
Institutional shareholders are well placed to provide 
monitoring, and this is particularly the case where they 
have adopted the Code. 
Prior research has examined the corporate 
governance role of institutional investors by examining 
the relation between institutional investment and market 
 10 
 
returns, profitability (Brous and Kini, 1994), executive 
compensation (Almazan et al., 2005), and earnings 
management (Koh and Hsu, 2005; Velury and Jenkins, 
2006; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Zeng et al., 2013). 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as 
occurring when managers use judgment in structuring 
transactions to modify financial reports so as to either 
mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of their firms, or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
Lo (2008) defines earnings quality as the sustainability of 
earnings and the unbiasedness or neutrality of the 
earnings and of the accounting policies and estimates 
used to generate earnings. 
The nature of their investment allows institutional 
investors to play a significant role in the governance of 
investee companies. There are two opposing views on the 
role institutional investors play in monitoring investee 
companies, known as the private benefit hypothesis and 
the active monitoring hypothesis (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 
2003; Velury and Jenkins, 2006). The private benefit 
hypothesis suggests that institutional investors with a 
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larger degree of investment have an opportunity to obtain 
undisclosed information which may be utilized for self-
serving behavior on the part of institutional investors 
(Koh, 2003). This hypothesis suggests institutional 
investors will have little or no influence over earnings 
quality. In contrast, the active monitoring hypothesis 
purports that institutional investors with substantial 
holdings levels have a greater incentive to actively 
monitor their investee companies (Jung and Kwon, 2002; 
Koh, 2003). This hypothesis suggests institutional 
ownership is associated with greater monitoring, less 
earnings management and consequently higher investee 
reported earnings quality.  
1.5 Research question 
This study extends existing work on the relation 
between the corporate governance role of institutional 
investors and the quality of reported earnings. Although it 
is widely accepted that institutional investors can play a 
corporate governance role through monitoring, their 
influence on earnings quality is still unclear. Specifically, 
this thesis examines whether adoption of the UK 
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Stewardship Code by institutional investors is associated 
with higher reported earnings quality by their investee 
companies as a result of improved governance. The broad 
research question is therefore: what impact does Code 
compliance by institutional investors have on earnings 
quality of investee companies? 
1.6 Motivation and Contribution 
There are several factors motivating this study. 
Firstly, there is the need for research to test the policy 
decision to implement the Code. There are costs 
associated with regulation and evidence is required to 
justify the imposition of costs. While there is a 
considerable body of evidence in the literature that the 
general UK governance codes of 1998 and 2003 have had 
a significant impact on the corporate governance systems 
of UK companies, there is a lack of evidence to support 
the Code. A number of commentators have expressed 
doubt that the Code will have the desired impact on 
governance by institutional investors. Cheffins (2010, 
p.1004) argues that even if the Code is a brave and 
worthwhile initiative, it is unlikely to “foster substantially 
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greater shareholder involvement in UK corporate 
governance”. Roach (2011) comments that in its current 
form, the Code’s impact on institutional investors’ 
engagement in the corporate governance of its investees 
is likely to be modest at best. In a recent paper Reisberg 
(2015, p.217) asserts that the Code is “absent of meaning 
and incapable of achieving its goal and will be ‘travelling 
along the road to nowhere’…” 
Prior studies have examined the financial 
characteristics of institutional investors (Bushee, 1998; 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2005). 
Several studies have found a relation between investment 
duration and monitoring by institutional investors (Porter, 
1992; Black and Coffee, 1994; Pound, 1988; Rajgopal 
and Venkatachalam, 1998). Other studies have 
considered how the size of the institutional investment is 
related to governance (Shleiferand Vishny, 1986; Black 
and Coffee, 1994; Stapledon, 1996; Maug, 1998). The 
present study makes a contribution to this literature by 
testing whether code compliance strengthens the positive 
relation between investment duration and both size and 
earnings quality. To the best knowledge of the researcher, 
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there is no existing empirical study that has examined the 
effectiveness of the Code. 
This study is also motivated by the debate 
surrounding the issue of shareholder engagement. 
Whether or not shareholder activism is useful and 
whether shareholder involvement generates net benefits 
are important issues for policymakers. For example, 
Plender (2010) argues that prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis, institutional investors supported the use of 
leverage to pursue high returns on equity and applied 
pressure for high dividends. Therefore, a close relation 
between investors and investee companies can have 
negative consequences.  
Wang (2014) suggests further research is needed 
to explore monitoring by institutional investors to 
enhance earnings quality. This study is motivated by the 
call for empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the 
Code and examines the association between the Code and 
investee companies’ earnings quality. Earnings data is 
key information provided in the financial reports of listed 
companies for investors, analysts and executives 
(Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and 
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Skinner, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010), which highlights the 
need to understand how governance is related to earnings 
quality. While there are a number of studies that examine 
the relation between institutional ownership and earnings 
quality (Koh, 2003; Koh and Hsu, 2005), this study is the 
first to explore the relation between compliance with the 
Code and earnings quality.  
1.7 Methodology 
Testable hypotheses are developed regarding 
whether institutional investors, who are subject to the 
Code, have an impact on the earnings quality of investee 
companies in the context of the opposing views of the 
role of institutional investors outlined in the private 
benefit hypothesis and the active monitoring hypothesis 
(Hashim and Devi, 2012; Velury and Jenkins, 2006).  
This study examines a sample of 98 UK investee 
companies listed in the Top 100 FTSE Index during the 
period 2010 to 2014, who had significant ownership by 
institutional investors. Archival data from the company 
financial reports is combined with both qualitative and 
quantitative information for the institutional investors. 
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Regression analysis is used to test the relation between 
the earnings quality of investee companies and Code 
compliance by their institutional investors. The analysis 
first examines the association between earnings quality 
and Code adoption by institutional investors. Second, 
because the quality of code compliance varies among 
institutional investors, the relation between Code 
compliance quality and earnings quality is further tested. 
An index is developed to categorize the type of 
disclosures made in relation to each institutional investors’ 
stewardship role according to each of the seven principles 
as soft (low quality) or hard (high quality), and to record 
Code compliance disclosure quality scores. Earnings 
quality is determined by the empirical model developed 
by Francis et al. (2005) that measures discretionary 
accruals quality.  
 
1.8 Summary of results 
Institutional investors with longer investment 
durations and higher block-holding levels help constrain 
investee firms’ earnings management and obtain higher 
earnings quality. However, no significant relation is 
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found between Code compliant institutional investors and 
investee firms’ earnings quality. A Code disclosure 
quality index is developed to determine Code compliance 
in more detail.  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research 
study. Chapter 2 describes the relevant literature on 
which this study is based and hypotheses are developed. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology applied in 
this study. Chapter 4 presents the results from the 
descriptive statistics of the data and the OLS regression 
models. Chapter 5 presents a summary of the study’s 
findings in addition to identifying limitations and 
opportunities for further research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
2.1 The UK Stewardship Code 
The Code specifies seven guiding principles 
developed to protect and enhance shareholder value when 
followed by institutional investors. The Code aims to 
enhance the quality of engagement between investors and 
companies in order to improve long-term risk-adjusted 
returns to shareholders (Financial Reporting Council, 
2012). The Code was first published in 2010, and was 
revised in 2012. The Code applies to institutional 
investors with equity holdings in UK listed companies 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2012). Therefore, the Code 
focuses on domestic investors, despite an increasing 
number of foreign investors in the UK market. The Code 
sets out best practice for institutional investors, and it 
requires all institutional investors to publish a statement 
concerning the extent to which they have complied with 
the Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). 
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As with the UK Corporate Governance Code, the 
Code is applied on a “comply or explain” basis. This 
regulatory approach can have drawbacks because 
evidence suggests companies that do not comply with 
voluntary codes often poorly explain their non-
compliance (Arsalidou, 2012). However, the comply or 
explain regulation avoids unnecessary costs associated 
with a mandatory “one size fits all” approach and allows 
companies flexibility to adopt practices best suited to 
their needs (Luo and Salterio, 2014). 
 
2.1.1 Origins of the Stewardship Code 
 
With levels of institutional investment increasing 
over the last three decades, many researchers have argued 
that concentrated ownership by institutional investors 
allows them to play a more effective and active 
governance role (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2004; 
Heineman and Davis, 2011; OECD, 2011). Institutional 
shareholder activism can assist in reducing agency 
problems and may mitigate the detrimental effects of 
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managers pursuing their own interests rather than the 
company’s interests. Effective engagement by 
institutional investors with their investee companies can 
improve governance, increase trust in the business and, 
more generally, improve market credibility (Gillan and 
Starks, 2000; Gifford, 2012). 
Institutional investors have traditionally tended to 
act as passive participants in investee UK companies. The 
Association of British Insurers and the National 
Association of Pension Funds disclosed in the Report of 
the Committee of Inquiry into UK Vote Execution that 
institutional voting at annual shareholder meetings was 
low, at around 20 per cent in the early 1990s. Myners 
(2007) reviewed shareholders’ voting activities from 2003 
to 2007, and found that voting levels at company 
meetings were around 50 per cent in late 2003 and in 
2007 voting levels for FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 were at 
61 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. The passive role 
of UK institutional investors raises the question of how to 
encourage institutional investors to participate more 
actively and effectively in corporate governance of 
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investee firms. This issue has been addressed in 
numerous UK reports. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) emphasized the 
importance of institutional investors and highlighted the 
potential use of their capacity to ensure investee 
companies comply with the Governance Code of Best 
Practice (Cadbury Report, 1992). The Cadbury Report 
contained only brief recommendations to institutional 
investors on their governance role, including 
communication with senior executive directors to 
exchange views on firm performance and management; 
use of voting rights; and utilisation of the right to appoint 
board directors (Cadbury Report, 1992). 
Following the Cadbury Report, governance 
reviews in the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel 
Report (1998) provided limited recommendations for 
institutional investors. The Greenbury Report discussed 
institutional investors’ disclosure of their ownership 
levels, business interests and directors’ activities. The 
report also recommended institutional shareholders 
should be invited to approve senior executive 
 22 
 
remuneration incentive schemes. The Hampel Report 
(1998) suggested that institutional shareholders should 
engage with investee companies as delegated monitors by 
voting on resolutions in general meetings or through 
informal communication with firms. 
However despite these earlier reports, the first 
version of UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(1998) provided only brief reference to the governance 
role of institutional investors. Section E of the Code 
focused on recommendations concerning institutional 
investors with three general principles from the Cadbury 
Report: institutional investors should be responsible when 
using their voting rights; they should have effective 
dialogue with companies based on the mutual 
understanding of goals; and, they should give due weight 
to all factors relating to board structure and composition 
when evaluating governance issues (The UK Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance, 1998). 
Later, following the Higgs Report (2003), the 
revised UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(2003) included discussion that emphasised the 
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importance of dialogue between the CEO and 
experienced independent directors and institutional 
investors. Section D of the Code includes the 
recommendations of the Higgs Report (2003) and 
suggests the board keep in touch with shareholders 
through the most practical and efficient methods. For 
instance, it is recommended that the chairman discusses 
governance strategy with major shareholders, and non-
executive directors should have a chance to attend 
meetings with major shareholders. In addition, the board 
should state the methods used to develop an 
understanding of shareholders’ views in the annual report, 
such as contact with analysts, brokers’ briefings or 
surveys of shareholder opinion. 
At this time Paul Myners was commissioned by 
the UK Government to investigate the role of institutional 
investors. The subsequent Myners Report (2001) made 
suggestions aimed at improving institutional investors’ 
engagement with corporate decision-making. Specifically, 
the report suggested improved monitoring in order to 
enhance overall company value and that there should be a 
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legal requirement that decisions by institutional investors 
should reflect the skill and prudence of someone familiar 
with the issues concerned. The report suggested these 
recommendations should be subject to voluntary adoption 
by institutional investors. Following the Myners Report 
(2001), the Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) 
announced it would revise the Principles on the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and their 
Agents. This was amended in 2005, and presented as the 
Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors 
(2005). Institutions that chose to disclose how they 
complied with the ISC Code were identified on the ISC 
website. 
In 2009 the Walk Review, “a review of corporate 
governance in UK banks and other financial industry 
entities”, suggested that the ISC code should be endorsed 
by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and renamed 
the Stewardship Code. In January 2010, the FRC 
published a consultation document regarding the content 
and operation of a proposed Stewardship Code. This 
consultation document raised issues regarding whether 
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the Stewardship Code should be based on the ISC code; 
whether the ISC Code should be amended; and whether 
the FRC should be responsible for superintending, 
inspecting and updating the proposed Stewardship Code. 
On 28 May 2010, the FRC updated the UK Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance and renamed it the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. The original Section E, 
which dealt with institutional investors, was updated to 
focus on general relations between the company and 
investors. On 2 July 2010, the UK Stewardship Code 
(2010) was launched by the FRC. The Code was updated 
in 2012 with amendments regarding aspects such as 
proposed definition of stewardship, the roles of asset 
owners and asset managers, conflicts of interest and 
extending the Code to other classes (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012).  
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2.1.2 The UK Stewardship Code Principles  
 
The UK Stewardship Code (2012) contains seven 
principles with substantial guidance under each principle. 
Principles one to seven set a foundation for improved 
institutional investor stewardship. Potentially, all of the 
seven principles benefit the institutional investor and 
investee company relationship through improved 
corporate governance. Principles three and four specially 
encourage institutional investors to engage in monitoring 
activities, and are therefore directly related to the issue of 
the impact of Code compliance on investee earnings 
quality. A summary of the seven Code principles follows: 
1. Publicly disclose their policy on how they will 
discharge their stewardship responsibilities: 
requires institutional investors to disclose the way 
they discharge their stewardship responsibilities in 
five areas. These include how they monitor 
portfolio companies and have active dialogue with 
the board; how they intervene in the governance; 
how they integrate internal affairs with wider 
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investment procedure; how they derive the policy 
on voting and make use of proxy voting or other 
voting advisory services; and how their 
explanations in relation to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code hold up. 
2. Have a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest in relation to stewardship, which should 
be publicly disclosed: outlines the necessity of 
having a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest and requires public disclosure of this 
policy. It emphasizes the duty of institutional 
investors to act in the interests of clients and 
beneficiaries when taking matters of engagement 
and voting into consideration. A policy should be 
maintained to manage avoidable conflicts of 
interest, such as conflicts when voting on matters 
affecting a parent company or client. 
3. Monitor their investee companies: requires 
institutional shareholders to monitor their investee 
companies and determine when it is necessary to 
enter into active communication with investee 
company boards.  As part of this monitoring, 
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institutional investors should be satisfied that 
board and committee structures are effectively 
operated. An audit trail is to be maintained 
regarding records of private meetings and votes 
cast. Institutional investors are required to attend 
the general meetings of companies in which they 
have a holding. If there is a departure from the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, investors should 
carefully explain and give reasoned judgments. 
Institutional investors should identify and disclose 
any possible problems that may lead to a loss in 
shareholder value at the very early stage. 
4. Establish clear guidelines on when and how they 
will escalate their stewardship activities: requires 
investors to establish clear guidelines on when 
and how they will escalate their activities to 
protect and enhance shareholder value. It requires 
institutional investors to set out the particular 
circumstances in which they will actively 
intervene. Initial discussion about intervention 
should take place on a confidential basis, but if 
there is no response from the investee company’s 
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board, investors can hold additional meetings with 
managers to discuss particular concerns or express 
concerns to a company’s advisers. 
5. Be willing to act collectively with other investors 
where appropriate:  discusses the collective action 
of institutional investors. The specific 
requirements are that appropriate collaboration 
among investors is necessary when significant 
corporate or wider economic stress or risk 
threatens the investee company’s development. 
The policy of collective engagement should be 
disclosed. 
6. Have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of 
voting activity: outlines the expectation that 
institutional investors have a clear policy on 
voting and disclosure of voting activities. 
Institutional investors should seek to vote 
whenever possible and they should not support the 
board automatically. It is necessary for them to 
inform the company of their voting intention and 
reasons in advance. Voting records and use of any 
proxy voting or voting advisory should be 
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publicly disclosed, or an explanation provided for 
non-disclosure. 
7. Report periodically on their stewardship and 
voting activities: requires institutional investors to 
report on their stewardship and voting activities 
periodically. 
 
These principles are intended to change the typically 
passive approach of UK institutional investors towards 
their investee to one of active engagement. Whether the 
Code has achieved, or will achieve, the objective of 
‘enhancing the quality of engagement between asset 
managers and companies to help improve long-term risk-
adjusted returns to shareholders’ (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012) is yet to be determined since there is little 
empirical evidence relating to the effectiveness of Code 
compliance. 
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2.1.3 Effectiveness of the Code 
The UK Stewardship Code is seen as ‘an 
important attempt to redress the balance in the corporate 
governance matrix and although similar efforts have been 
taken in other markets, such as France and the 
Netherlands, the Code is the first of its type in the world’ 
(Arsalidou, 2012, p.342). Sullivan (2010) reports that the 
CEO of the International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN) described the UK Stewardship Code as offering a 
method to address inactivity of shareholders and 
indifference by institutional investors regarding 
governance matters. However, it is not clear whether a 
more systematic and continuous relationship between 
institutional investors and managers will evolve through 
the Code (Arsalidou, 2012). The extent to which the Code 
will transform traditional passive shareholders into active 
participants and foster good governance remains an open 
question (OECD, 2009; Cheffins, 2010). This study 
provides evidence of the relation between Code 
compliance by institutional investors and the quality of 
earnings of the investee companies. 
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In contrast, potential limitations of the Code have 
been identified that raise questions as to whether it is 
capable of achieving its objectives. One major concern is 
the Code’s limited application to domestic companies. 
Several factors deter institutional investors from activism, 
but a central factor is ownership of shares by companies 
that are not required to apply the Code (Cheffins, 2010). 
Further, a large proportion of shares are held by overseas 
investors, hedge funds and private individuals.  A 2008 
survey of ordinary shareholdings conducted by the UK 
National Statistics office shows 41.5 per cent ownership 
by investors outside the UK to whom the Code will not 
apply (Reisberg, 2011). Hence the domestic focus of the 
Code and the lack of coverage for many investee 
companies could limit the Code’s ability to achieve its 
objective.  
A further concern stems from the Code’s 
voluntary “comply or explain” regulatory approach. 
Institutional investors can choose not to comply with the 
Code, and the only penalty for non-compliance is failure 
to be listed on the FRC website as compliant. Arcot et al. 
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(2005) conducted a study on the “comply or explain” 
model adopted by the UK Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance and found that non-compliant institutional 
investors usually disclosed a poor explanation of reasons 
for not complying. In addition, one in five non-complying 
institutional investors did not provide any explanation. 
Therefore, the comply-or- explain approach also 
represents a potential limitation. However, there is also 
evidence that companies take advantage of the flexible 
and adaptable nature of the comply-or-explain model to 
fine-tune their governance according to their 
circumstances (Luo and Salterio, 2014). 
Issues with the lack of broad coverage of the 
Code, and potential problems with its comply-or-explain 
approach could affect its operation. Thus the future of the 
Code is uncertain at this time. Reisberg (2015) calls for 
further research to investigate the effectiveness of actual 
compliance by UK institutional investors. 
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2.2 Institutional Investors 
Monks and Minow (1995) refer to three main 
pillars of governance, which are shareholders, 
management (led by the CEO), and the board of directors. 
Institutional investors are a subgroup of the first category 
(Stapledon, 1995). Their role in corporate governance has 
drawn increasing attention given their capacity to 
influence the board. There are various definitions of an 
institutional investor in the accounting and finance 
literature. Broadly they are defined as organisations that 
aggregate and invest large sums of money in companies 
and who can play an active role in corporate governance 
of their investees (Gillan and Starks, 2000; 2003). 
Shareholders are the owners of the firm who have 
certain rights, including the election of the board of 
directors. The directors are responsible for monitoring 
managers’ performance. If shareholders (e.g., institutional 
investors) are not satisfied with the performance of 
directors and managers they can “vote with their feet” by 
selling their shares. Alternatively, they can hold their 
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shares but voice their dissatisfaction, or do nothing and 
hold their shares. 
Institutional investors are a diverse body that 
differ in their investment horizons and risk preference but 
are united in the same purpose of maximising profit on 
their investments. In a review of institutional investment 
in the UK, Myners (2001) identified the types of 
institutional investors as occupational pension funds, 
insurance companies, pooled investment vehicles (e.g., 
unit trusts, open-ended investment companies and 
investment trusts) and other financial institutions (e.g., 
charities, endowments and educational institutions). 
Myners (2001) observed that, since the 1960s, the 
proportion of UK equity capital acquired by institutions 
has increased. Institutional investors, mainly in the form 
of insurance companies and investment funds, dominate 
the UK share markets and have become the largest 
owners of shares in listed companies (Goergen et al., 
2008). Myners (2001) suggests three beneficial effects for 
the UK economy from the increase in institutional 
investment. First, the presence of large and sophisticated 
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institutional investment improves the liquidity of capital 
markets and is positively related to the effectiveness of 
capital raising. Second, savers and pension scheme 
members receive benefits from the substantial 
investments made by institutions. Third, institutional 
shareholding is an important factor in building the 
strength of the UK financial service sector. 
This study categorises institutional investors 
according to Nix and Chen (2013) as banks, mutual funds, 
pension funds, hedge funds, endowments, insurance 
companies, private equity funds and wealth funds. The 
adoption of this categorisation is in line with the Code 
definition of institutional investors: 
“Broadly speaking, asset owners include pension funds, 
insurance companies, investment trusts and other 
collective investment vehicles. As the providers of capital, 
they set the tone for stewardship and may influence 
behavioural changes that lead to better stewardship by 
asset managers and companies. Asset managers, with 
day-to-day responsibility for managing investments, are 
well positioned to influence companies’ long-term 
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performance through stewardship.” (Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), 2012, p.1). 
2.2.1 The governance role of institutional investors 
Whether institutional investors can play an active 
and effective governance role has been discussed in 
previous literature. Webb et al. (2003) use financial 
system theory as a framework for discussing the 
problems and limitations of institutional investors taking 
a more active monitoring role in enforcing UK corporate 
governance. They argue that there are three concerns with 
institutional investors taking on a governance role. The 
first concern arises from the difficulty of institutional 
investors to align financial market efficiency with 
governance (Fama, 1970; 1991; 1998). The second 
concern is whether institutional investors have sufficient 
incentives to participate in governance as delegated 
monitors. The third concern relates to the monitoring 
costs for an institution, and whether they can absorb the 
cost of investors’ influence on the company’s strategy and 
also bear the uncertain consequence(s) of the chosen 
strategy. Webb et al. (2003) also conclude that the 
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increased involvement of institutional investors may 
create problems for the operation of capital markets, 
increase costs and lead to free rider problems. Therefore, 
it is unclear whether institutional investors will be willing 
to take on a substantive governance role regardless of the 
imposition of the Code. 
Agency theory is often applied as a theoretical 
framework to analyse the monitoring role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance. Specifically, agency 
theory describes the relationship between the principal 
and agent and the agency problem that arises when there 
is principal-agent conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency problems arise from the separation of ownership 
and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Research has 
found that agency costs are positively related to corporate 
ownership that is diffuse or consists of a large number of 
small shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Roe, 
1990). Large shareholders have few incentives to monitor 
the management of their portfolio firms when there is a 
diffuse ownership structure, because the large shareholder 
will bear monitoring costs while other shareholders enjoy 
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the benefits (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In contrast, firms 
with a concentrated ownership structure may have lower 
agency costs, since large shareholders are more likely to 
be involved in monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002). 
Evidence that institutional investors play a 
meaningful governance role through monitoring is 
limited. In the US, Romano (1993) and Murphy and Nuys 
(1994) analyse the monitoring role of institutional 
investors according to their types using an agency theory 
framework. They show that managers of public funds 
may use their influence to achieve personal or political 
goals, rather than maximizing a firm’s value, which 
prevents fund managers from being effective monitors. 
Other institutions, such as corporate pension funds, banks 
and insurance companies may be unwilling to intervene 
in investee company affairs since they are reluctant to be 
in conflict with investee firm management or endanger 
cooperative relations (Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). 
McCahery and Vermeulen (2008) find that corporate 
governance is of importance to institutional investors, and 
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many institutions are willing to engage in shareholder 
activism. Moreover, evidence shows that shares held by 
institutions increase with the quality of governance 
(Chung et al., 2002). The literature shows that 
institutional investors can form an effective external 
governance mechanism in the US; however, there is little 
evidence on the governance role played by institutional 
investors outside the US (Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
In the UK, there is evidence that institutional 
investors are moving from mostly passive policies to 
more active involvement in investees (Short and Keasey, 
2005). Typically, as a heterogeneous group, institutional 
investors have different investment objectives and targets, 
and have less interest in governance. They try to achieve 
their goals or desirable performance through selling or 
buying shares, and tend not to vote regularly but limit 
their intervention to crisis situations (Black and Coffee, 
1994). However, institutional investors have tended to 
move away from their traditional passive role in more 
recent times. UK research shows that as institutional 
investment increases within an entity, there is increasing 
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interest in monitoring activities by institutions (Ridge, 
1999). 
Previous studies also examine the association 
between institutional monitoring and improvement in 
long-term performance. Bushee (1998) concludes that 
there is a positive relation between institutional 
shareholding and the level of research and development 
expenditures. He examines whether institutional investors 
create incentives for managers to reduce investment in 
research and development (R&D) to achieve short-term 
goals of earnings. He reported that sophisticated 
institutional investors pursue long-term value rather than 
focusing on short-term benefits. In contrast, Wahal and 
McConnell (2000) find no evidence that institutional 
investors contribute to short-term managerial decisions 
regardless of investment style. 
As stated in Principle 3 of the Code, “institutional 
investors should monitor their investee firms and seek to 
be informed of the company’s performance”. It is clear 
from the evidence discussed that institutional investors 
can contribute to the governance role through monitoring. 
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However, there are limitations and problems associated 
with the effective execution of the monitoring role and 
appropriate interventions in the affairs of investee 
companies. When institutional investors comply with the 
Code, these limitations and problems should be mitigated, 
resulting in enhanced monitoring. 
2.3 Institutional investors and earnings quality 
This study examines the impact of the Code on 
the earnings quality of their investee companies. Dechow 
et al. (2010) describe earnings quality as measuring the 
extent to which reported earnings numbers faithfully 
represent the fundamental earnings performance. Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as 
occurring when managers use judgment in structuring 
transactions to modify financial reports, to either mislead 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of their portfolio firms, or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
The terms earnings quality and earnings management are 
commonly used interchangeably in the literature as they 
are two sides of the same coin, as when earnings quality 
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is high, earnings management is low and vice versa 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore this study draws also on 
the earnings management literature. 
To the extent that institutional investors play a 
governance role by monitoring their investee companies, 
a reduction in the propensity for investee companies to 
engage in earnings management should be observed (Lin 
et al., 2014). Monitoring will include assessment of the 
quality of financial reporting, and institutional investors 
have the capacity to discipline managers who engage in 
low quality accounting reporting (Velury and Jenkins, 
2006). 
Pound (1988) put forward three hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between institutional investors and earnings 
management: (1) the efficient monitoring hypothesis; (2) 
the strategic alignment hypothesis; and (3) the conflict of 
interest hypothesis.  
The efficient monitoring hypothesis explains that 
institutional investors can better constrain earnings 
management than individual investors, as they have 
monitoring expertise and monitoring is less costly for 
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them. Institutional investors can decrease information 
symmetry so that it is more difficult for managers to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings (Shiller and Pound 
1989). Further, Pound (1988) contends that the larger the 
shareholding by institutional investors, the more efficient 
the monitoring, resulting in a reduced likelihood of 
earnings management.  
In contrast, the strategic alignment hypothesis 
states that large institutional shareholders align 
themselves with incumbent managers. This hypothesis 
suggests institutional investors’ behaviour will be affected 
by their relation with investee company management, 
which can result in a lower likelihood of monitoring 
success. Similar to the strategic alignment hypothesis, the 
conflict of interest hypothesis explains that investor 
companies will vote to pass proposals in general meetings 
based on their personal advantage, which also decreases 
the likelihood of successful monitoring behaviour.  
Hence, the efficient monitoring hypothesis 
predicts institutional investors will engage in monitoring 
resulting in higher reported earnings quality, whereas the 
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strategic alignment and conflict of interest hypotheses 
predict unsuccessful monitoring. Pound (1988) 
investigated proxy contests and found that institutions 
were more likely to vote in favour of management, which 
indicated they were not likely to be efficient monitors. 
The result suggests that institutions strategically align 
with the current management, and seek returns towards 
their own advantage when faced with conflicts of interest. 
Hence this behaviour indicates that institutional investors 
will not constrain earnings management and therefore 
enhance earnings quality. 
The incentives for institutional investors to play a 
role in ensuring the quality of reported earnings has also 
been discussed in terms of the private benefit view and 
the active monitoring view (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; 
Velury and Jenkins, 2006). The private benefit view 
suggests that substantial institutional investors have an 
opportunity to obtain undisclosed information, which 
may be utilized for self-serving behavior by institutional 
investors (Koh, 2003). In contrast, the active monitoring 
view is that substantial institutional investors have a 
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greater incentive to actively monitor their investee 
companies (Jung and Kwon, 2002; Koh, 2003), which 
reduces the likelihood of earnings management, resulting 
in higher reported earnings quality. Consistent with the 
private benefit view, Beasley (1996) and Peasnell et al. 
(2005) find institutional investors are ineffective in 
reducing earnings management (enhancing earnings 
quality). Porter (1992) suggests the reason that 
institutional investors may not display an interest in 
monitoring earnings management is that they tend to 
focus on current earnings when pricing securities. 
However, some prior research provides support for the 
active monitoring view, suggesting institutional investors 
mitigate earnings management (Chung et al., 2002; Mitra 
and Cready, 2005; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007). 
The results of studies that have examined the 
relation between institutional investors and earnings 
management may be influenced by their treatment as a 
homogenous group (Jiang and Anandarajan, 2009; Wang, 
2014). Analysis that treats institutional shareholders as 
heterogeneous has provided more consistent results. Later 
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studies have found that investment duration and 
investment level are associated with increased monitoring 
and mitigation of earnings management (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998; Koh, 2003; Koh and Hsu, 
2005; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Wang, 2014). 
Thus, it is appropriate to examine the role of institutional 
investors in mitigating earnings management with 
analysis that is conditioned on their categorization as 
long-term or short-term investors (investment duration), 
and as large or small investors (investment size).  
The Code specifically encourages monitoring and 
escalation of stewardship activity by institutional 
investors, to achieve improved corporate governance. 
Therefore, hypotheses are developed according to 
whether Code compliance will help long-term 
institutional investors and higher block-holding 
institutional investors further constrain investee company 
earnings management thereby resulting in higher earnings 
quality.  
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2.3.1 Investment duration and earnings quality 
Short-term or transient institutional investors are 
characterized as myopic investors who prefer current 
earnings to long-term earnings, and prefer to sell shares 
in poor performance investees (Pound and Shiller, 1987; 
Black et al., 1998; Bushee, 2001). Such institutional 
investors focus on short-term profit and underweight 
long-term value creating incentives (Porter, 1992; Levitt, 
1998). In contrast, long-term institutional investors 
exhibit a preference for long-term earnings (Bushee, 
2001). Consistent with this view, Dobrzynski (1993) 
suggests that long-term institutional investors introduce 
management accountability measures through 
involvement in governance and monitoring activities. For 
instance, they set boundaries on accruals discretion to 
curb potential undesirable accruals management. Long-
term institutional investors are motivated by their desire 
to prevent misrepresentation of their portfolio firms’ 
financial affairs. Bushee (1998) suggests that institutional 
investors can reduce agency problems to some extent 
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when they take a greater interest in the long-term value of 
their investee companies. 
A study in the US market by Porter (1992) 
provides evidence that short-term or transient institutional 
investors (with a short-term focus on company 
performance) are associated with managers that increase 
earnings through accounting and operational decisions.  
Black and Coffee (1994) explain that the investment 
horizons of transient institutional investors are limited 
because of the need for managers to rebalance portfolios 
to improve performance compared to their industry peers. 
Under this condition, institutions “vote with their feet” 
rather than deal with governance matters actively. 
In contrast, the benefits of monitoring associated 
with longer term investments have been demonstrated in 
studies that have considered institutional investment and 
earnings management. Koh (2003) provides evidence that 
transient institutional investors have incentives for 
managers to manipulate income-increasing earnings, 
while long-term institutional investors are motivated to 
mitigate managers’ aggressive earnings management. Hsu 
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and Koh (2005) extend the work of Koh (2003) and 
reveal the co-existence of the opposing influences of 
short-term and long-term investment for Australian 
companies. 
The prior literature suggests that institutional 
investors are more likely to monitor the management of 
investee firms in which they have made a long-term 
substantial investment.  In this study, the joint effect of 
institutional investors and their compliance with the Code 
is tested. The Code encourages institutional investors to 
actively engage in the governance of investee companies 
and to provide disclosure of their monitoring activities. In 
particular, Principle 3 of the Code requires institutional 
investors to monitor their investee firms. This suggests 
they will give attention to the quality of reporting 
earnings. If institutional investors comply with the Code, 
their monitoring should decrease information asymmetry 
and increase overall transparency, leading to a decrease in 
the likelihood of managers managing earnings and thus 
improving the quality of reported earnings. Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that: 
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H1: The positive association between institutional 
investor investment duration and investee company 
earnings quality is stronger if institutional investors 
comply with the UK Stewardship Code. 
2.3.2 Block-holding levels and earnings quality 
The ability of an institutional investor to influence 
management of an investee firm is associated with the 
investment size (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998). 
It is possible for stakeholders with significant ownership 
of a firm to participate in the management of a company. 
They are able to ensure the company operates in the 
interest of shareholders, and they also have informational 
advantages as economies of scale may reduce the costs of 
acquiring information (Maug, 1998). Roychowdhury and 
Watts (2007) show that institutional investors with higher 
shareholding reduce managerial discretion. Institutional 
shareholders have greater incentive to monitor managers’ 
behaviour, collect information and pursue a better 
information environment (Wang, 2014). Black and Coffee 
(1994) and Stapledon (1996) provide evidence that large 
institutional investors stand to benefit more from 
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successful monitoring and intervention than investors 
with a small shareholding. 
There is substantial evidence that higher levels of 
shareholdings by institutional investors reduce the 
likelihood of accounting manipulation and myopic 
earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996; Bushee, 
1998; Xia and Li, 2008; Edmans, 2009). Schipper (1989, 
p.98) argues that “concentrated user groups with 
substantial financial sophistication, material sums at 
stake, and no contractual friction to inhibit their behavior 
are, for example, likely candidates for undoing earnings 
management”. Given the investment size of institutional 
investors, larger institutional investors fit the profile of 
“concentrated user groups”. Consistent with this view, 
Gillan and Starks (1998) note that when the level of 
ownership is sufficiently high, monitoring by institutional 
investors discourages managers from providing “noisy” 
financial reports. In summary, prior studies provide 
evidence that institutional investment size is positively 
related to the earnings quality. 
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There is some evidence that there is an optimal 
level of shareholding by institutional investors, beyond 
which the incentives to monitor management are limited. 
Navissi and Naiker (2006) suggest that institutions which 
have representatives as board directors in investee 
companies have greater incentives to monitor 
management. However, once the ownership exceeds a 
certain level, institutional investors with board 
representatives may induce managers to make sub-
optimal decisions, which may include earnings 
management. 
Even though contrary views exist, this study relies 
on the majority of prior work that shows a positive 
relation between the size of institutional investment and 
earnings quality. As explained above, institutional 
investors’ compliance with the Code is expected to 
improve governance through monitoring, thereby 
mitigating information asymmetry and increasing overall 
transparency. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the Code 
will result in better-reported earnings quality at a given 
size of institutional shareholding. 
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H2: The positive association between institutional 
shareholding size and investee company earnings quality 
is stronger if institutional investors comply with the UK 
Stewardship Code. 
2.4 Other factors impacting earnings quality  
There are other investee characteristics that are 
likely to be associated with earnings quality identified in 
the prior literature. This study includes a number of 
control variables, board size and independence, growth, 
age, size, leverage, performance and industry 
classification. 
Board size is a key characteristic that can influence the 
quality of board monitoring. Previous studies show that 
larger boards have more experience and knowledge and 
bring more diverse opinions and viewpoints, which 
strengthens the monitoring function (Chaganti et al., 
1985; Dalton et al., 1999) and may enhance earnings 
quality. However, Xie et al. (2003) show that difficulties 
with coordination of a large board may offset the 
advantages of increased monitoring and resources.  
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Board independence. Prior studies in the UK, US 
and Australia suggest a negative relation between board 
independence and earnings management (Beasley, 1996; 
Peasnell et al., 2000; Klein, 2002 and Cornett et al., 
2008). In line with these results, it is expected that 
investee companies with higher board independence will 
have higher earnings quality. 
Other board variables that have been found to be 
related to earnings quality are CEO duality (O’Connor et 
al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2008), and engagement of a Big 
4 auditor by the company (Balsam et al., 2003; Lam and 
Mensah, 2006). For the sample used in this study all 
companies have separated the role of the chairperson and 
the CEO, and all are audited by a Big 4 audit firm. 
Therefore, the variables are not included in the analysis 
since there is no variation.  
Growth. The ratio of book to market value, 
calculated as total assets minus total liabilities divided by 
total market capitalization, is a proxy measure of firm 
growth. Teoh et al. (1998) argue that growing companies 
are more inclined to manage earnings since it is difficult 
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to observe managers’ business activities. Furthermore, 
companies with high growth rates are more likely to 
experience internal accounting control issues, which may 
lead to earnings manipulation (Larcker and Richardson, 
2004). Consistent with previous studies it is expected that 
investee companies with higher growth will have a lower 
quality of reported earnings.  
Age. Company age is also included as a control 
variable as it has previously been found to be negatively 
related to earnings management (Bergstresser et al., 2006; 
Jiang et al., 2010). Hence it is expected that older 
investee companies will have higher earnings quality.  
Company size. It is suggested by previous 
research that larger companies have better corporate 
governance structures (Smith and Watts, 1992). Smaller 
companies are more likely to experience information 
asymmetry (Noe and Rebello, 1996). Hence it is expected 
larger investee companies will have higher earnings 
quality. 
Leverage. Previous studies show that leverage can 
influence risk management and accruals manipulation 
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(Smith and Stulz, 1985), and that managers attempt to 
avoid the violation of debt covenant by manipulating 
earnings (Sweeney, 1994). It is expected that investee 
companies with higher leverage will have lower quality 
of reported earnings. 
Company performance. Managers of companies 
with poor performance are more likely to manage 
earnings in order to keep their position (Kothari et al., 
2005). Hence it is expected that better performing 
investee companies will have higher earnings quality.  
Industry. Propensity to manage earnings is likely 
to vary across industry groups. 
 This chapter has reviewed the principles of the UK 
Stewardship Code in detail, and added to the discussion 
on the effectiveness of the Code by pointing out the 
advantages and limitations of its content and compliance 
model.  The literature regarding the corporate governance 
role of institutional investors were reviewed from two 
perspectives, including the impact of different investment 
durations and different block holdings on earnings 
quality. The hypotheses were identified and fundamental 
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information identified that can provide incremental 
information relating to the association between 
compliance with the UK Code by institutional investors 
and investee firms’ earnings quality. The following 
chapter outlines the research methods applied to examine 
the hypotheses developed here.
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Chapter 3 - Research Method 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research method adopted 
for this study. The study applies quantitative and 
qualitative research methods to investigate the association 
between institutional investors’ compliance with the UK 
Stewardship Code (the Code) and investee company 
earnings quality. 
Regression analysis is used to test the relation 
between the earnings quality of investee companies and 
Code compliance by their institutional investors. The 
analysis first examines the association between earnings 
quality and Code adoption by institutional investors. 
Second, because the quality of code compliance varies 
among institutional investors, analysis is presented that 
tests the relation between Code compliance quality and 
earnings quality. In these tests, earnings quality is 
determined by the empirical model developed by Francis 
et al. (2005) that measures discretionary accruals quality.  
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The hypotheses (stated in Chapter 2) suggest that the 
positive association between investment duration and 
investment size is stronger when institutional investors 
comply with the Code. To test the hypotheses, interaction 
terms are included in the regression models between 
investment duration and size and the code compliance 
variables. A positive coefficient for the interaction 
variables will support the hypotheses that Code 
compliance strengthens the relation between earnings 
quality and investment duration and size. In addition to 
regression analysis with interaction terms for the Code 
compliance variables, the direct relation between Code 
compliance and earnings quality is tested. 
The qualitative aspect of this research is the 
application of content analysis to develop an index that 
measures the quality of institutional investors’ Code 
compliance. Institutional investors provide information 
about their compliance with the Code in annual report 
disclosure statements. The index developed classifies 
disclosure as either objective, measurable and verifiable 
high quality ‘hard’ disclosures, or subjective unverifiable 
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‘soft’ disclosures. The extent of ‘hard’ disclosures is the 
measure of Code compliance quality used in the analysis. 
3.2 Sample and Data 
The sample consists of Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) 100 companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) in 2013. The FTSE 100 includes 
LSE companies with the highest market capitalization. A 
sample period of 2013 was selected for the study as it 
allows for sufficient time to have elapsed from the 
introduction of the Code in 2010 for it to be sufficiently 
embedded into company practice. 
Companies in the financial industry group were 
excluded from the initial sample of FTSE 100 companies 
in 2013 (19 companies in total) because they have 
substantially different financial characteristics and 
governance practice (Fama and French, 1992). Two other 
companies were excluded from the sample due to 
bankruptcy and merger proceedings, leaving a final 
sample of 79 investee companies.  
The next task is identification of each investee 
company’s institutional investors. Institutional investors 
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are identified using data from the Capital IQ database, 
and their shareholding data are manually collected from 
company annual reports. In total, 103 different 
institutional investors were identified as having a 
shareholding in the 79 investee companies in the sample. 
To determine the quality of institutional investor 
Code compliance, an index is developed using content 
analysis of disclosures made under the Code provisions. 
Institutional investors that comply with the Code disclose 
how they adhere with the Code’s seven principles. Using 
the official investor company websites, a search was 
conducted for investor Code compliance statements. Of 
the 103 institutional investors, 51 provided Code 
compliance reports. The companies that did not provide 
reports were 45 foreign investor companies (who are not 
subject to the Code provisions) and seven UK companies 
for which no compliance statement was found. Of the 7 
UK companies who did not comply with the Code, only 
two provided an explanation for their non-compliance. 
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3.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is reported 
earnings quality, which is determined using the technique 
developed by Francis et al. (2005) to measure 
discretionary accruals quality. Following is a discussion 
of the method applied to determine the dependent 
variable. 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality 
measure is the starting point for the measurement of 
earnings quality. Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
accruals quality as the magnitude of errors in estimating 
accruals based on the association between cash flows and 
accruals. The essence of their model is that earnings 
quality can be measured by examining accruals 
estimation and cash flow realizations. Estimation error is 
defined as the difference between the amount accrued and 
the amount realized. Empirically, Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) define earnings quality as the association between 
working capital accruals and cash flows in the adjacent 
periods using the company-level regression shown in 
Equation (1) below. 
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∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡                                    
(1) 
∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 is the change in accounts receivable, the change in 
accounts payable, the change in taxes payable, the change 
in inventory and change in other 
assets.  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1  are cash flows from 
operations in the previous period, current period and the 
next period, respectively. The residuals from the 
regression represent the accruals that are not explained by 
the realizations of cash flows. The standard deviation of 
the regression residuals is the company-level measure of 
accrual quality, and a higher value of standard deviation 
means lower earnings quality.   
McNichols (2002), in her review of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) paper outlining the accruals quality model, 
shows that change in sales and the size of plant, property 
and equipment increase the model’s performance. 
McNichols (2002) suggests the adjusted model shown in 
Equation (2) below. 
∆𝑊𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 +
𝛽4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                 (2) 
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The adjusted model adds the change in sales revenue 
( ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡) , and the size of property, plant and 
equipment (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡). Each of the variables in the accrual 
quality model is scaled by total assets.   
The residual or error term ( 𝜀𝑡)  in Equation (2) 
provides the measure of earnings quality. It represents the 
portion of accruals that does not estimate actual cash 
flows. Dechow and Dichev (2002) use the standard 
deviation of firm-level annual regression residuals over a 
five-year period as the measurement of accruals quality. 
However, they suggest using the absolute value of the 
residual from annualized cross-sectional regressions as an 
alternative appropriate measure. The advantage of this 
method is it has fewer data requirements. Accordingly, 
this study uses the absolute value of the residual for the 
fiscal year 2013 to measure accruals quality (AQ). A 
higher absolute value of AQ indicates lower earnings 
quality, since a higher absolute value represents larger 
estimation error. 
Using the overall accruals quality measure calculated 
as discussed above, the technique suggested by Francis et 
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al. (2005) is then applied to determine the discretionary 
component of overall accruals quality. This is done 
because the analysis in this thesis is concerned with the 
effects of earnings management on the quality of reported 
earnings. Calculating discretionary accruals quality 
involves regressing the accruals quality measure on 
innate company characteristics (Francis et al., 2005). The 
selected innate characteristics follow Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and Francis et al. (2005), and include measures of 
company size, incidence of negative earnings, length of 
operating cycle, and volatility of operating environment. 
To determine the components of accruals quality, the 
regression shown in Equation (3) is calculated. 
𝐴𝑄 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑌𝐶 +
𝛽4𝑆𝐷𝑂𝑅 + 𝜀𝑡         (3) 
Where AQ is the accruals quality measure (the 
regression residual from equation (2)); SIZE is the natural 
log of total assets for 2013; LOSS is negative earnings, 
measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if negative net 
profit after tax reported in 2013, otherwise zero; OPCYC 
is the natural log of average age of inventory plus the 
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average age of receivables (in days) after winsorizing at 
365 days for 2013; SDOR is the standard deviation of 
operating revenue divided by total assets for 2012 to 2014. 
The regression predicted values are the estimate of innate 
accruals quality, and the residual values are the estimate 
of discretionary accruals quality (DAQ). Discretionary 
accruals quality (DAQ) measures earnings quality, and is 
the dependent variable in models used in this thesis to test 
the hypotheses. A higher value of DAQ suggests more 
earnings management, and therefore lower earnings 
quality. 
3.4 Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this study are the 
investment duration (INVDUR) of the five largest 
institutional investors; the size of shareholding of the five 
largest institutional investors (INVSIZE); an indicator of 
institutional investor Code compliance (CODECOMP1); 
and the quality of Code compliance as determined by 
content analysis of institutional investor Code compliance 
statements (CODEQUAL1). 
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Investment duration (INVDUR) is the sum of the 
number of years the five largest institutional investors in 
2013 have owned shares in the investee company. Size of 
institutional investment (INVSIZE) is the sum of the 
value of shares owned by the five largest institutional 
investors in the sample of investee companies. It is 
measured as the percentage of ownership, and is 
calculated by dividing the number of shares held by the 
foreign and domestic institutional investors by the total 
shares issued by the company.  
The Code compliance variable (CODECOMP1) is a 
dummy indicator coded 1 if the number of compliant 
institutional investors in the investee company exceeds 
the median number of compliant institutional investors 
across all investee companies, and is otherwise coded 
zero. Code compliance quality (CODEQUAL1) is also a 
dummy variable. It is coded 1 if the sum of the ‘hard’ 
disclosures made by the five largest institutional investors 
(as determined by content analysis of Code compliance 
statements) is larger than the median of ‘hard’ disclosures 
made by the five largest institutional investors across all 
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investee companies, and is otherwise coded zero. 
Disclosures are classified as ‘hard’ if they are accessible, 
objective and verifiable. Each Code principle for which 
the investor makes a ‘hard’ disclosure is scored with a 
value of 1. Details of the content analysis method used to 
determine ‘hard’ disclosures are described in Section 3.7 
below. 
3.5 Control Variables 
The control variables included are investee company 
characteristics that have been found in prior literature to 
be associated with earnings management. These include 
board independence and size, growth, leverage, size, age, 
performance and industry classification. 
Board size (BDSIZE), measured as the number of 
directors, is a key characteristic that can influence the 
quality of board monitoring. Previous studies show that 
larger boards have more experience and knowledge and 
bring more diverse opinions and viewpoints, which 
strengthens the monitoring function (Chaganti et al., 1985; 
Dalton et al., 1999). Recall that a lower value of the 
dependent variable DAQ means higher earnings quality. 
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A negative relation is therefore expected between board 
size and DAQ.  
Board independence (BDIND) is measured as the 
number of non-executive directors on the board divided 
by the total number of directors. Prior studies in the UK, 
US and Australia suggest a negative relation between 
board independence and earnings management (Beasley, 
1996; Peasnell et al., 2000; Klein, 2002 and Cornett et al., 
2008). In line with these results, it is expected investee 
companies with higher board independence will have 
better earnings quality; namely, board independence is 
expected to be negatively related to DAQ. 
Growth. The ratio of book to market value, 
calculated as total assets minus total liabilities divided by 
total market capitalization, is a proxy measure of firm 
growth (GROWTH). Consistent with previous studies it 
is expected that investee companies with higher 
GROWTH will have lower quality of reported earnings. 
It is hypothesized that there is a negative relation between 
GROWTH and earnings quality, thus a positive 
association is expected between GROWTH and DAQ.   
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Company age (AGE), measured as the number of 
years since the company was founded, is also included as 
a control variable as it has previously been found to be 
negatively related to earnings management (Bergstresser 
et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2010).  
Leverage ratio (LEV) is measured as total liabilities 
divided by total assets. Previous studies show that 
leverage can influence risk management and accruals 
manipulation (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and managers 
attempt to avoid the violation of debt covenants through 
manipulating earnings (Sweeney, 1994). Thus, a positive 
association is expected between leverage and DAQ.  
Company size (SIZE) is measured as the natural log 
of total assets. It is suggested by previous research that 
larger companies have better corporate governance 
structures (Smith and Watts, 1992). Smaller companies 
are more likely to experience information asymmetry 
(Noe and Rebello, 1996). Therefore, a negative relation is 
expected between SIZE and DAQ. 
Company performance is measured by return on 
assets (ROA), which is calculated as earnings before tax 
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and interest divided by total assets, and adjusted by 
dividing the industry average return on assets ratio. 
Managers of companies with poor performance are more 
likely to manage earnings in order to keep their position 
(Kothari et al., 2005). Therefore, a negative relation 
between company performance (ROA) and DAQ is 
expected.  
Propensity to manage earnings is likely to vary 
across industry groups. Industry dummy variables (IND) 
are therefore included in the analysis as control variables. 
Dummy variables are included as fixed effects for the 
following industry sectors: materials, consumer staples, 
industrials, energy, information technology, healthcare, 
consumer discretionary, telecommunication services and 
utilities.  
3.6 Statistical Models 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to test 
whether compliance with the Code by institutional 
investors is associated with investee company earnings 
management. The models that test the direct effects of 
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code compliance are shown in Equations (4) and (5) 
below:  
𝐷𝐴𝑄 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+𝛼5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +
𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛
𝑛=19
𝑖=11 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                          
(4)      
𝐷𝐴𝑄 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿1𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+𝛼5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +
𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼𝑛 ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛
𝑛=19
𝑖=11 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                          
(5) 
In Equations (4) and (5), the dependent variable 𝐷𝐴𝑄 
is the measure of discretionary accruals quality for 
investee companies (see discussion in Section 3.4 above). 
Independent variables include characteristics of the 
institutional investment. Analysis is also conducted using 
interactions between the code compliance variables and 
investment duration and size. The presence of a 
significant interaction shows that the effect of one 
variable on the dependent variable is different for values 
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of another independent variable. In this analysis, it is 
posited that any negative relation between discretionary 
accruals quality and investment duration and size will be 
strengthened by both Code compliance and higher quality 
Code compliance. The models to test interaction effects 
of code compliance are shown in Equations (6) and (7) 
below: 
𝐷𝐴𝑄 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑡x𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1𝑡 +
 𝛼5𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡x𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃1𝑡 +
 𝛼6𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+𝛼7𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +
𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛
𝑛=21
𝑖=13 + 𝜀𝑡   
                                                                    
(6) 
𝐷𝐴𝑄 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿1𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑡𝑥𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿1𝑡 +
 𝛼5𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡𝑥𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿1𝑡 +
 𝛼6𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡+𝛼7𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +
𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛
𝑛=21
𝑖=13 + 𝜀𝑡   
                                                                     
(7) 
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In the regression for Code compliance (Equation (6)), 
the coefficients 𝛼4  and 𝛼5 indicate whether Code 
compliance moderates the relation between DAQ and 
investment duration (INVDUR) and size (INVSIZE). 
Similarly, for the Code quality regression (Equation (7)), 
the coefficients 𝛼4  and 𝛼5 show if Code compliance 
quality moderates the relation between DAQ and 
investment duration and size. A significant and negative 
relation for the coefficients 𝛼4 and 𝛼5 in both equations 
will indicate that compliance with the Code and better 
Code compliance quality is associated with a lower DAQ 
value and therefore higher earnings quality.     
For analysis using interactions, it is recommended 
that continuous predictor variables are centred because 
this makes regression coefficients more interpretable and 
reduces potential collinearity among predictor variables 
(Aiken and West, 1991; McClelland and Judd, 1993). 
Centring is performed by subtracting the mean from a 
variable, leaving deviation scores. This procedure is 
applied to continuous predictor variables in the regression 
models.  
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3.7 Content Analysis 
Prior governance studies have used content analysis 
of company disclosures to assess their quality (Singhvi 
and Desai, 1971; Williamson, 1985; Forker, 1992; Chen 
and Jaggi, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003). In this study, Code 
compliance information from disclosures by institutional 
investors is likewise used to assess the quality of Code 
compliance. Fifty-one Code compliance disclosure 
statements of institutional investors are located on 
institutional investor company websites. The quality of 
Code disclosures is investigated and documented 
according to an index that scores the quality of 
institutional investors’ adherence to the Code.   
To ensure reliability of the content analysis a 
doctoral student was employed as a second coder for 
measuring disclosure quality. Reliability is concerned 
with the consistency of scoring produced by independent 
observers. To measure reliability, Krippendorff’s alpha 
(Krippendorff, 2004) is estimated to determine the coding 
agreement. 
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A Code compliance quality index documenting 
information about the extent of institutional investors’ 
adherence to the Code is constructed. The disclosure 
metric is based on adherence to each principle in the 
Code as disclosed in the compliance statements. Three 
attributes of disclosure quality are ‘completeness, 
accuracy and reliability’ according to Singhvi and Desai 
(1971, p131). The transparency and objectivity of 
information about how institutional investors comply 
with the Code is investigated. Specifically, disclosures 
are examined to determine whether institutional investors 
comment on each Code principle and whether the 
disclosed information is objective or subjective. 
Institutional investor disclosures that provide objective 
information about compliance with the relevant Code 
principle are classified as ‘hard’ disclosures. Otherwise, 
general and indirect information are categorised as ‘soft’ 
disclosures’.  
Hard disclosure means information on code 
compliance is objectively measured, stated clearly and 
accessible. Examples of ‘hard’ disclosures for Code 
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principles are: the frequency of meetings between 
institutional investor representatives and fund managers; 
whether institutional investors have regular meetings with 
the management of investee companies to discuss the 
company strategy; disclosure of voting history, process 
and method; and whether institutional investors report 
periodically on their stewardship and voting activities. In 
contrast, ‘soft’ disclosures are more subjective, less 
capable of verification and lack evidence.  
In determining the disclosure score, Code 
compliance statements for each of the seven Code 
principles are examined. When an investor is considered 
to have made a ‘hard’ disclosure on any of the Code 
principles, it receives a score of one. Each of the seven 
Code principles is evaluated, and a score ranging from 0-
7 is determined for each institutional investor. The final 
score is the total number of Code principles for which at 
least one ‘hard’ disclosure is made.  
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3.7.1 Index reliability tests 
There are three forms of content analysis reliability: 
stability, reproducibility and accuracy (Krippendorff, 
2004), with reproducibility being the most frequently 
reported (Weber, 1990). When content analysis involves 
human coding it is important to validate the coding 
scheme (Neuendorf, 2002). Reproducibility involves 
‘inter-coder reliability’ and ‘intersubjective agreement’ 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p215), and signifies the degree to 
which independent judges make the same coding 
decisions (Lombard et al., 2002). According to 
Krippendorff (2004), at least two independent coders are 
required for reproducibility. Accordingly, for this study, a 
Doctoral student with a background in finance was 
employed as the second coder. The second coder fulfils 
the preconditions for generating reliable data, which are 
an understanding of the coding instructions and capacity 
to effectively carry out the coding process (Krippendorff, 
2004).  
To confirm coding agreement, Krippendorff’s 
agreement coefficient alpha (Krippendorff, 2004) was 
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determined for the researcher and the second employed 
coder. Minimum alpha levels for acceptability of 
reproducibility are 70 per cent, 80 per cent or higher is 
acceptable in most situations, and greater than 90 per cent 
is ideal (Neuendorf, 2002).   
3.8 Summary 
In summary, this chapter has explained the sample 
and data used in this study. Also, it provides a detailed 
description of the dependent and independent variables 
used in the regression models that test whether Code 
compliance moderates the relation between investment 
size and duration and earnings quality. The chapter also 
describes the content analysis method used to measure 
the quality of Code compliance by institutional investors. 
Details of the disclosure index are provided and the 
method of testing coding reliability is outlined. Table 1 
below shows a summary of variables used in the analyses 
and provides the descriptor used for each variable in the 
analysis reported in the next chapter. 
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Table 1: Summary of Variables 
 
Descriptor Variable Measurement 
Panel A: AQ regression model  
Dependent variable 
WC Change in 
working capital 
Change in accounts 
receivable, accounts 
payable, taxes 
payable, inventory 
and other current 
assets 
Independent variable  
CFOt-1 Cash flows in 
previous year 
Cash flows from 
operating activities in 
2012 
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CFOt Cash flows in 
current year 
Cash flows from 
operating activities in 
2013  
CFOt+1 Cash flows in 
next year 
Cash flows from 
operating activities in 
2014  
REV Change in sales 
revenue 
Measured as sales 
revenue in 2013 
minus sales revenue 
in 2012  
PPEt Property, plant 
and equipment  
Reported property, 
plant and equipment 
in 2013 
Panel B: DAQ regression model 
Dependent variable   
AQ Accruals 
quality 
Standard deviation of 
the regression 
residuals for 2010-
2014 
Independent variable  
SIZE Company size.  Natural log of total 
assets. 
LOSS Negative 
earnings 
Dummy variable 
coded 1 if negative 
net profit after tax 
reported in 2013; 
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otherwise 0 
OPCYC Operating cycle Natural log of average 
age of inventory plus 
the average age of 
receivable for 2012 
and 2013 
SDOR Volatility Windsorised standard 
deviation of operating 
revenue for 2012 to 
2014 
Panel C: Code compliance and disclosure quality 
regression model 
Dependent variable  
DAQ Discretionary 
accruals quality 
Absolute value of 
residuals from 
regression shown in 
Equation 2 for sample 
of investee companies 
Independent Variable  
INVDUR Institutional 
Investment 
duration 
Number of years the 
five largest 
institutional investors 
in 2013 have held 
their ownership in the 
investee company 
INVSIZE Institutional 
Investment 
size. Size of 
share 
Measured as the 
percentage of 
ownership calculated 
by dividing the 
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ownership of 
the five largest 
institutional 
investors in the 
sample of 
investee 
companies 
number of shares held 
by the foreign and 
domestic institutional 
investors by the total 
shares issued by the 
company 
CODECOMP1 Code 
compliance 
dummy 
variable 
Coded 1 if 
CODECOMP* larger 
than its median; 
otherwise 0 
CODEQUAL1 Quality of 
Code 
compliance 
dummy 
variable 
Coded 1 if 
CODEQUAL* larger 
than its median; 
otherwise 0 
Control Variables  
BDSIZE Board size Number of directors 
BDIND 
 
Board 
independence 
Number of non-
executive directors on 
the board divided by 
the total number of 
directors 
GROWTH 
Book to market 
ratio 
Total assets minus 
total liabilities 
divided by market 
capitalization 
LEV Leverage ratio 
Total liabilities 
divided by total assets 
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SIZE Company size 
Natural log of total 
assets 
AGE Company age 
Number of years 
since the company 
was founded 
ROA 
Return on 
assets 
Net income divided 
by total assets 
IND 
Industry 
classification 
based on GICS 
Dummy variables for 
industry sectors: 
materials, consumer 
staples, industrials, 
energy, information 
technology, 
healthcare, consumer 
discretionary, 
telecommunication 
services and utilities 
*Note: CODECOMP means Code Compliance, the 
indicator for institutional investors that comply with the 
Code. It is the number of Code compliant investors 
among the five largest institutional investors. 
CODEQUAL is quality of Code compliance, indicating 
the number of ‘hard’ disclosures in the investor’s Code 
compliance statement related to the seven principles 
outlined in the Code. Disclosures are classified as ‘hard’ 
if they are objective and verifiable.  
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Chapter 4 - Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to identify the relation between 
compliance with the UK Stewardship Code by 
institutional investors and investee company earnings 
quality.  The analysis presented tests the hypothesis that 
Code compliance is associated with less earnings 
management and therefore higher earnings quality. In this 
chapter, results of the analyses conducted are presented. 
First, results are presented of analysis conducted to 
measure discretionary accruals quality, which is the 
dependent variable in the main regression analyses. 
Second, details of the disclosure index that is used to 
measure Code compliance quality are reported. Third, 
descriptive statistics of dependent and independent 
variables in the main analysis are presented. Fourth, 
results of regression analyses that test the relation 
between Code compliance by institutional investors and 
investee earnings quality are reported. 
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4.2 Earnings Quality 
Table 2 reports results of regressions conducted to 
measure discretionary accruals quality. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the method involves two steps. The first step is 
to determine overall accruals quality by regressing past, 
present and future cash flows on the current period 
change in working capital. Following McNichols (2002), 
change in revenue and current period reported property, 
plant and equipment are also included in the model. 
Results of this regression are reported in Panel A of Table 
2. The residual value of this regression is the overall 
measure of accruals quality (AQ). 
The second step (reported in Panel B of Table 2) is to 
regress the overall accruals quality measure (AQ) against 
innate company characteristics. The residual value from 
this regression is the measure of discretionary accruals 
quality as it is the portion of overall accruals quality that 
is not explained by company fundamentals (Francis et al. 
2005).  
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Table 2: Regressions for Discretionary Accruals Quality 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Panel A (n=79): McNichols model (Equation (2)) 
CFO12 -0.016 -0.09 0.927 
CFO13 0.245 1.30 0.198 
CFO14 -0.137 -1.39 0.170 
ΔREV 0.019 0.28 0.783 
PPE 0.001 0.08 0.937 
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Constant -0.004 -0.29 0.773 
Model Statistics F=0.89 
Adj. R square -0.194 
Panel B (n=79): Francis et al. (2005) model (Equation (3)) 
SIZE 0.010 0.748 0.457 
LOSS 0.055 2.240 *0.028 
OPCYC -0.021 -1.622 0.109 
SDOR 0.000 -0.411 0.683 
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Constant 0.005 0.089 0.929 
Model Statistics F=2.44 
Adj. R square 0.068 
Notes: * denotes significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p< 0.05, and *** significant at p<0.01. 
The dependent variable in the McNichols (2002) model is ΔWC, which is the change in 
accounts receivable, the change in accounts payable, the change in taxes payable, the change 
in inventory and change in other assets. CFO12, CFO13 and CFO14 are reported cash flows 
from operations in year 2012, 2013 and 2014. ΔREV is change in sales revenue from 2012 to 
2013, and PPE is reported property, plant and equipment in 2013. The dependent variable in 
the Francis et al. (2005) reported in Panel B of Table 2 is the residual from the McNichols 
(2002) model reported in Panel A of Table 2. SIZE is the natural log of total assets for 2013. 
LOSS is a dummy variable coded 1 if negative net profit after tax is reported in 2013, and 0 
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otherwise. OPCYC is the natural log of average age of inventory plus the average age of 
receivables (in days) after winsorizing at 365 days, for 2013. SDOR is the standard deviation 
of operating revenue divided by total assets for 2012 to 2014.  
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4.3 Disclosure index 
Table 3 below reports the Code disclosure analysis 
for each Code compliant institutional investor in the 
sample. There are 51 institutional investors complying 
with the Code for which compliance statements are found.  
In Table 3, the second to fourth columns record the 
number of words, paragraphs and pages of the Code 
compliance statements for each institutional investor 
company. The average number of words of the Code 
compliance statements is 1565 ranging from 192 to 6102. 
The average length of compliance statements is 18 
paragraphs, with a mean of 3.4 pages. The average score 
of disclosure quality is 3.2 for the sample, with a 
minimum score of zero and a maximum score of seven. 
The next seven columns document disclosure quality 
for each principle in the UK Stewardship Code guidelines. 
Each company is scored as having made at least one hard 
disclosure (recorded as ‘H’), or as having only made soft 
disclosures (‘S’). The last column in Table 3 is the total 
number of hard disclosures for each institutional investor, 
 93 
 
which is the index score measure of compliance quality 
used in the main analysis. 
Krippendorff’s (2004) alpha is used to measure the 
reliability of the coding (detailed results of the alpha 
estimation are reported in Appendix). The coefficient 
alpha value is 0.851 (85 per cent), which is an acceptable 
reliability score and indicates the index scoring is reliable 
(Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004). 
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Table 3: Code Disclosure Analysis 
Institutional Investor Word Para. Page P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 Index 
Score 
Aberdeen Asset 
Management PLC  
1977 20 5 H H H S S H S 4 
Allianz Asset 
Management AG 
490 7 1 H H H S S H H 5 
Artemis Investment 
Management LLP 
2850 24 5 H S H S S H H 4 
Artisan Partners 1590 21 3 S H H S S H S 3 
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Limited Partnership 
Aviva Investors 
Global Services 
Limited 
671 9 2 H S S H S H H 4 
AXA Investment 
Managers S.A. 
1086 14 4 H H H S S H H 5 
Baillie Gifford and 
Co. 
192 3 1 S S S S S S S 0 
BlackRock, Inc. 1611 13 3 H H S H S H H 5 
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BNP Paribas 
Investment Partners 
933 16 3 H H H H H H H 7 
BNY Mellon Asset 
Management 
764 7 3 H S H H S H H 5 
Brandes Investment 
Partners, L.P. 
753 9 2 H S S S H H H 4 
Brewin Dolphin 
Limited 
1066 20 3 S H S S S H H 3 
Cantillon Capital 
Management LLC 
959 8 3 S S H H S H H 4 
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Cazenove Capital 
Management Limited 
745 9 2 H S S S S S S 1 
Cevian Capital 
Limited 
567 10 2 H S S S S S S 1 
Cohen and Steers 
Capital Management, 
Inc. 
913 12 3 H S S H S S H 3 
Comgest S.A. 1221 19 4 H S S S S S S 1 
Coronation Fund 
Managers Limited  
1063 12 3 S S S H S S S 1 
 98 
 
FIL Limited 2050 21 5 H S H H S H H 5 
Franklin Resources, 
Inc.  
943 12 2 H H H S S H H 5 
Genesis Asset 
Managers, LLP 
1303 20 4 S H H H S H H 5 
Henderson Global 
Investors Limited 
1267 20 5 H S S S S H H 3 
HSBC Global Asset 
Management (UK) 
Limited 
1265 16 2 H H S S S H H 4 
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Invesco Ltd.  1394 18 2 H S S H S H S 3 
Investec Asset 
Management Limited 
1105 9 2 H S S S S S H 2 
JPMorgan Asset 
Management 
Holdings Inc. 
1373 20 2 H H H H S H H 6 
Kames Capital plc 1069 9 3 H S H H S H H 5 
Lazard Asset 
Management LLC 
4353 43 6 H H H H H H H 7 
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Legal and General 
Investment 
Management Limited 
2629 35 4 H S S H S H H 4 
Lindsell Train 
Limited 
702 12 2 S S S S S S S 0 
Marathon Asset 
Management, LLP 
560 12 2 S S H S S H S 2 
Massachusetts 
Financial Services 
Company 
3258 13 3 H H S S S H S 3 
Mitsubishi UFJ Asset 571 9 2 S S S S S S S 0 
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Management Co., 
Ltd. 
Mondrian Investment 
Partners Limited 
2185 27 4 H H S S H H H 5 
Morgan Stanley 
Investment 
Management Inc. 
1288 17 2 H H H S S H H 5 
Norges Bank 
Investment 
Management 
1602 16 3 S S S S S S S 0 
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Northern Cross, LLC 729 12 2 H H S S S S S 2 
Odey Asset 
Management LLP 
1258 19 3 H H S S S H S 3 
Old Mutual Global 
Investors 
380 4 1 S S S S S S S 0 
Pictet Asset 
Management Limited 
1260 27 6 S S S S S S H 1 
Putnam LLC 2138 23 6 H S S S S S S 1 
Schroder Investment 
Management Limited 
1579 27 4 S H S S S H H 3 
 103 
 
Silchester 
International 
Investors LLP 
3291 29 5 H S H S S H H 4 
Standard Life 
Investments Limited 
3364 44 9 H H S S S H H 4 
State Street Global 
Advisors, Inc. 
4080 41 5 H H S H S H H 5 
T. Rowe Price 
Group, Inc.  
1536 10 4 H H S S S H H 4 
The Vanguard 2044 27 4 H H S S S H H 4 
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Group, Inc. 
UBS Global Asset 
Management 
6102 55 8 S S H S S H H 3 
Veritas Asset 
Management LLP 
708 13 2 H S H S S S S 2 
Walter Scott and 
Partners Limited 
1308 20 4 S S S S S H S 1 
Wellington 
Management Group 
LLP 
1680 20 4 S S S S S S S 0 
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4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for dependent 
and independent variables included in the main regression 
analysis. Institutional ownership of sample companies is 
described by two variables. Institutional investment 
duration (INVDUR) is the sum of the years the five 
largest institutional investors have retained holdings in 
the investee company. INVDUR has an average of 17.6 
years, with a minimum of 7 years and a maximum sum of 
24 years. Institutional investment size (INVSIZE) is the 
sum of the five largest institutional investors in the 
investee companies. INVSIZE has an average of 22.2 
percent, ranging from 6.1 to 54.7 percent.  
The range of Code compliance scores (CODECOMP) 
for institutional investors across the investee companies 
extended from 0 - 5, with a median of 4. Of the sample 
companies, 44 have at least 4 Code compliant 
institutional investors, and 35 firms have less than 4 
institutional investors. CODEQUAL, which is the 
aggregate score of Code compliance for the top five 
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institutional investors, has a range from 0 to 28, with a 
median of 17 and a mean of 16.6. CODEQUAL1 shows 
that the Code disclosure quality score of institutional 
investors in 46 firms were above the median score for 
CODEQUAL. 
Panel A in Table 2 also shows descriptive statistics 
for the corporate governance financial characteristics of 
the sample companies. For the board governance 
variables, the number of directors (BDSIZE) ranges from 
6 to 28, with an average board size of 10 and a median of 
11, and an average of 64 percent of boards comprised of 
non-executive directors (BDIND). Company size, 
measured as the natural log of reported total assets, has an 
average of 10. The book to market ratio, which indicates 
the growth of sample firms (GROWTH), ranges from -
0.01 to 3.9 with a mean of 0.5. The number of years since 
the firms were founded (AGE) varies between 1 and 196 
years, with a mean of 81 years. The leverage ratio (LEV) 
of sample companies has a maximum value of 1.0 and a 
minimum of 0.002 with a mean of 0.6. The return on 
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assets (ROA) ratio ranges from -0.002 to 0.4 with an 
average value of 0.1.  
Finally, the industry classification of the sample 
firms shows industrials (INDUS) and consumer 
discretionary (CD) to be the largest groups, with 20 and 
17 companies respectively. Of the remaining industry 
groups, there are 12 companies in consumer staple (CS), 
6 in energy (ENERGY), 4 in healthcare (HC), 2 in 
information technology (IT), 2 in telecommunication 
(TELEC) and 5 companies in utilities (UTILI). 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (n=79) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
INVDUR 17.582 3.350 7.000 18.000 24.000 
INVSIZE 22.153 7.770 6.091 21.470 54.651 
CODECOMP 3.443 1.035 0.000 4.000 5.000 
CODEQUAL 16.595 5.464 0.000 17.000 28.000 
BDSIZE 11.038 3.535 6.000 10.000 28.000 
BDIND 0.643 0.158 0.214 0.636 1.000 
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SIZE 9.994 0.585 9.102 9.881 11.553 
GROWTH 0.492 0.530 -0.014 0.347 3.875 
AGE 81.013 58.812 1.000 77.000 196.000 
LEV 0.589 0.187 0.002 0.592 1.024 
ROA 0.117 0.059 -0.002 0.109 0.350 
Panel B: Dummy variables 
 Coded 1 Coded 0    
CODECOMP1 44.000 35.000    
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CODEQUAL1 46.000 33.000    
LOSS 4.000 75.000    
Industry      
CD 17.000 62.000    
CS 12.000 67.000    
ENERGY 6.000 73.000    
HC 4.000 75.000    
INDUS 20.000 59.000    
IT 2.000 77.000    
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MAT 11.000 68.000    
TELEC 2.000 77.000    
UTILI 5.000 74.000    
SIZE is company size, measured as natural log of total assets; LOSS is negative earnings, 
measured as dummy variable coded 1 if negative net profit after tax is reported in 2013; 
otherwise 0. INVDUR is institutional investment duration, measured as number of years the 
five largest institutional investors in 2013 have held their ownership in the investee company. 
INVSIZE is institutional investment size (size of share ownership of the five largest 
institutional investors in the sample of investee companies), measured as the percentage of 
ownership calculated by dividing the number of shares held by the foreign and domestic 
institutional investors by the total shares issued by the company. CODECOMP is Code 
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Compliance, indicator for institutional investors that comply with the Code, measured as 
number of Code compliant investors among the five largest institutional investors. 
CODECOMP1 is the Code compliance dummy variable, coded 1 if CODECOMP is larger 
than its median; otherwise 0. CODEQUAL is quality of Code Compliance, measured as the 
number of ‘hard’ disclosures in the investor’s Code compliance statement related to the seven 
principles outlined in the Code. Disclosures are classified as ‘hard’ if they are objective and 
verifiable. CODEQUAL1 is quality of Code compliance dummy variable, coded 1 if 
CODEQUAL larger than its median; otherwise 0. BDSIZE is board size, measured as the 
number of directors. BDIND is board independence, measured as the number of non-
executive directors on the board divided by the total number of directors. GROWTH is book 
to market ratio, measured as total assets minus total liabilities divided by the market 
capitalization. LEV is leverage ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. AGE 
is company age, measured as the number of years that the company has been founded; ROA is 
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return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets; industry dummy variables 
include materials (MAT), consumer staples (CS), industrials (INDUS), energy (ENERGY), 
information technology (IT), healthcare (HC), consumer discretionary (CD), 
telecommunication services (TELEC) and utilities (UTILT). 
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4.5 Bivariate Tests 
Table 5 reports correlation measures for all 
independent variables included in the regression analysis. 
The correlations between the Code compliance indicator 
and other independent and control variables are not 
significant. Code disclosure quality (CODEQUAL1) was 
significantly correlated with leverage (LEV) (p<0.05). Of 
the institutional ownership characteristics, investment 
duration (INVDUR) was significantly correlated to 
investee company board size (BDSIZE) and company 
size (SIZE) at p<0.01. Institutional investment size 
(INVSIZE) was significantly correlated to total assets 
(SIZE) at p<0.01, and significantly correlated with board 
size (BDSIZE) (p<0.1). None of the reported correlations 
are of significant magnitude to suggest concerns with 
multicollinearity.
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Table 5: Correlation matrix (n=79) 
 INV
DUR 
INVS
IZE 
COD
ECO
MP1 
COD
EQU
AL1 
BDSI
ZE 
BDI
ND 
GRO
WTH 
AG
E 
SIZE LE
V 
ROA 
INVDU
R 
1.00
0 
          
INVSIZ
E 
-
0.12
6 
1.000          
 0.26
8 
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CODEC
OMP1 
-
0.12
3 
0.013 1.000         
 0.28
2 
0.912          
CODEQ
UAL1 
0.05
6 
-0.035  1.000        
 0.62
6 
0.761          
BDSIZE ***0
.313 
*-
0.205 
-
0.019 
0.017 1.000       
 0.00 0.070 0.868 0.886        
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5 
BDIND 0.03
0 
-0.153 -
0.053 
-
0.007 
***-
0.292 
1.00
0 
     
 0.79
0 
0.180 0.642 0.954 0.009       
GROWT
H 
-
0.08
7 
-0.005 -
0.002 
0.028 -
0.007 
-
0.00
3 
1.000     
 0.44
6 
0.964 0.984 0.804 0.949 0.98
2 
     
AGE 0.09 0.017 - - 0.053 0.10 -0.134 1.0    
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0 0.127 0.139 7 00 
 0.42
9 
0.883 0.264 0.223 0.645 0.34
9 
0.240     
SIZE ***0
.351 
***-
0.421 
-
0.024 
0.080 ***0.
362 
0.14
2 
***0.
331 
-
0.1
36 
1.000   
 0.00
2 
0.000 0.833 0.483 0.001 0.21
3 
0.003 0.2
33 
   
LEV 0.05
3 
-0.147 0.186 **0.2
29 
0.068 -
0.15
2 
**-
0.237 
-
0.1
58 
0.149 1.0
00 
 
 0.64 0.195 0.102 0.042 0.552 0.18 0.036 0.1 0.191   
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2 0 64 
ROA 0.10
8 
0.091 -
0.009 
-
0.146 
-
0.134 
0.04
5 
***-
0.389 
0.1
70 
***-
0.352 
0.1
51 
1.00
0 
 0.34
5 
0.426 0.936 0.201 0.238 0.69
1 
0.000 0.1
35 
0.002 0.1
84 
 
Notes: * denotes significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p< 0.05, and *** significant at p<0.01. 
INVDUR is institutional Investment duration, measured as number of years the five largest 
institutional investors in 2013 have held their ownership in the investee company. INVSIZE is 
institutional investment size (size of share ownership of the five largest institutional investors 
in the sample of investee companies), measured as the percentage of ownership calculated by 
dividing the number of shares held by the foreign and domestic institutional investors by the 
total shares issued by the company. CODECOMP is Code Compliance, an indicator for 
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institutional investors that comply with the Code, measured as the number of Code compliant 
investors among the five largest institutional investors. CODECOMP1 is a Code compliance 
dummy variable, coded 1 if CODECOMP is larger than its median; otherwise 0. 
CODEQUAL is quality of Code Compliance, measured as the number of ‘hard’ disclosures in 
the investor’s Code compliance statement related to the seven principles outlined in the Code. 
Disclosures are classified as ‘hard’ if they are objective and verifiable. CODEQUAL1 is 
quality of Code compliance dummy variable, coded 1 if CODEQUAL is larger than its 
median; otherwise 0. BDSIZE is board size, measured as the number of directors. BDIND is 
board independence, measured as the number of non-executive directors on the board divided 
by the total number of directors. GROWTH is book to market ratio, measured as total assets 
minus total liabilities divided by the market capitalization. LEV is leverage ratio, measured as 
total liabilities divided by total assets. AGE is company age, measured as the number of years 
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that the company has been founded; ROA is return on assets, measured as net income divided 
by total assets. 
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4.6 Multivariate Analysis 
4.6.1 Direct effect regressions 
The regressions of Code compliance indicators and 
investee firms’ characteristics on the measure of 
discretionary accruals quality (DAQ) are reported in 
Table 6. The analysis shows the direct effects of Code 
compliance on discretionary accruals, with Panel A 
reporting results for the code compliance indicator 
(CODECOMP1) and Panel B reporting results for the 
Code compliance quality indicator (CODEQUAL1). Both 
models are significant, and the adjusted R-square values 
show that 9.4 and 8.6 percent of variance in DAQ is 
explained by the models, respectively.  
The two Code compliance variables CODECOMP1 
and CODEQUAL1 are not significant in either model. 
The two institutional ownership variables, investment 
duration (INVDUR) and investment size (INVSIZE), are 
significant at p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively. The 
coefficients are negative, so longer duration and greater 
size of investment is negatively related to discretionary 
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accruals quality (DAQ). A smaller value of DAQ means 
less earnings management and therefore higher earnings 
quality. The results for duration and size are consistent 
with prior studies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 
1998; Koh, 2003; Koh and Hsu, 2005; Roychowdhury 
and Watts, 2007; Wang, 2014). 
The proportion of independent directors on the board 
(BDIND) is significantly negatively related to DAQ in 
both models. This negative significant relation between 
board independence and earnings management is 
consistent with previous studies showing that larger 
number of outside directors is linked to more effective 
board monitoring and less incidence of financial fraud 
(Brickley et al., 1994; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996; 
Peasnell et al., 2005).  
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Table 6: Regression Results - Direct Effects 
Panel A: Code Compliance (Equation (4)) 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic p value 
Constant  0.024 2.708 ***0.009 
INVDUR - -0.003 -2.515 **0.015 
INVSIZE - -0.001 -1.761 *0.083 
CODECOMP1 - -0.008 -1.09 0.280 
BDSIZE - 0.001 0.394 0.695 
BDIND - -0.05 -1.763 *0.083 
GROWTH + 0.005 0.603 0.549 
AGE - 0.000 0.613 0.542 
SIZE - -0.009 -0.861 0.393 
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LEV + 0.014 0.601 0.55 
ROA - 0.048 0.574 0.568 
Industry Included     
Model Statistics F=1.448 
Adj. R-Squared 0.094 
Panel B: Code Compliance Quality model (Equation (5)) 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic p value 
Constant  0.024 2.544 **0.014 
INVDUR - -0.003 -2.285 **0.026 
INVSIZE - -0.001 -1.795 *0.078 
CODEQUAL1 - -0.007 -0.804 0.425 
BDSIZE - 0.001 0.381 0.705 
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BDIND - -0.048 -1.694 *0.095 
GROWTH + 0.005 0.565 0.574 
AGE - 0.000 0.59 0.558 
SIZE - -0.009 -0.817 0.417 
LEV + 0.012 0.487 0.628 
ROA - 0.051 0.606 0.547 
Industry Included     
Model Statistics F=1.406 
Adj. R-Squared 0.086 
Notes: * denotes significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p< 0.05, and *** significant at p<0.01. 
The discretionary accruals quality (DAQ) is used as a proxy for earnings quality, which is the 
dependent variable in the empirical models. INVDUR is institutional Investment duration, 
measured as the number of years the five largest institutional investors in 2013 have held their 
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ownership in the investee company. INVSIZE is institutional investment size (size of share 
ownership of the five largest institutional investors in the sample of investee companies), 
measured as the percentage of ownership calculated by dividing the number of shares held by 
the foreign and domestic institutional investors by the total shares issued by the company. 
CODECOMP is Code Compliance, an indicator for institutional investors that comply with 
the Code, measured as the number of Code compliant investors among the five largest 
institutional investors. CODECOMP1 is the Code compliance dummy variable, coded 1 if 
CODECOMP is larger than its median; otherwise 0. CODEQUAL is quality of Code 
Compliance, measured as the number of ‘hard’ disclosures in the investor’s Code compliance 
statement related to the seven principles outlined in the Code. Disclosures are classified as 
‘hard’ if they are objective and verifiable. CODEQUAL1 is the quality of Code compliance 
dummy variable, coded 1 if CODEQUAL is larger than its median; otherwise 0. BDSIZE is 
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board size, measured as the number of directors. BDIND is board independence, measured as 
the number of non-executive directors on the board divided by the total number of directors. 
GROWTH is book to market ratio, measured as total assets minus total liabilities divided by 
the market capitalization. LEV is leverage ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total 
assets. AGE is company age, measured as the number of years that the company has been 
founded; ROA is return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets; Industry 
classifications include consumer staples, industrials, energy, information technology, 
healthcare, consumer discretionary, materials, telecommunication services and utilities.  
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4.6.2 Interaction effect regressions 
Regression analysis with interaction terms for Code 
compliance and Code compliance quality is presented in 
Table 7. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in Table 6. Both models are significant, 
and the adjusted R-square values show that 9.4 and 8.7 
percent of variance in DAQ is explained by the models, 
respectively. 
Investment duration (INVDUR) and investment size 
(INVSIZE) are both negatively significantly related to 
earnings management (p<0.05). Four interaction terms 
are included to test the hypotheses that Code compliance 
and Code compliance quality moderates the relation 
between investment size and duration and DAQ. The 
analysis reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 show 
that none of the interaction variables are significant. 
However, the regression results for the second interaction 
term in equation (6) indicate a marginal significant 
relation (p<0.1) between Code compliant institutional 
investors and their investee firms’ earnings management. 
It shows the DAQ increase 0.002 with every unit increase 
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in investment size (INVSIZE) of Code compliant 
institutional investors. Therefore, the results do not 
provide support for H1 and H2.  
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Table 7: Regression Results - Interaction Effects 
Panel A: Code Compliance (Equation (6)) 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic p value 
Constant  0.020 2.137 0.037 
INVDUR - -0.004 -2.16 **0.035 
INVSIZE - -0.001 -2.168 **0.034 
CODECOMP1 - -0.008 -1.088 0.281 
INVDUR*CODECOMP1 - 0.000 0.11 0.913 
INVSIZE*CODECOMP1 - 0.002 1.417 *0.162 
BDSIZE - 0.001 0.731 0.468 
BDIND - -0.045 -1.561 *0.124 
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GROWTH + 0.000 0.257 0.798 
AGE - 0.000 0.589 0.558 
SIZE - -0.008 -0.769 0.445 
LEV + 0.011 0.436 0.665 
ROA - 0.079 0.916 0.363 
Industry Included     
Model Statistics F=1.404 
Adj. R-Squared 0.094 
Panel B: Code Compliance Quality (Equation (7)) 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient t-statistic p value 
Constant  0.024 2.500 0.015 
INVDUR - -0.003 -1.755 *0.085 
INVSIZE - -0.001 -2.234 **0.029 
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CODEQUAL1 - -0.006 -0.787 0.435 
INVDUR*CODEQUAL1 - -0.001 -0.35 0.728 
INVSIZE*CODEQUAL1 - 0.002 1.343 *0.184 
BDSIZE - 0.001 0.555 0.581 
BDIND - -0.037 -1.242 0.219 
GROWTH + 0.000 0.221 0.826 
AGE - 0.000 0.445 0.658 
SIZE - -0.005 -0.426 0.672 
LEV + 0.005 0.184 0.854 
ROA - 0.095 1.065 0.291 
Industry Included     
Model Statistics F=1.373 
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Adj. R-Squared 0.087 
Notes: * denotes significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p< 0.05, and *** significant at p<0.01. 
The discretionary accruals quality (DAQ) is used as a proxy for earnings quality, which is the 
dependent variable in the empirical models. INVDUR is institutional Investment duration, 
measured as the number of years the five largest institutional investors in 2013 have held their 
ownership in the investee company. INVSIZE is institutional investment size (size of share 
ownership of the five largest institutional investors in the sample of investee companies), 
measured as the percentage of ownership calculated by dividing the number of shares held by 
the foreign and domestic institutional investors by the total shares issued by the company. 
CODECOMP is Code Compliance, an indicator for institutional investors that comply with 
the Code, measured as the number of Code compliant investors among the five largest 
institutional investors. CODECOMP1 is the Code compliance dummy variable, coded 1 if 
CODECOMP is larger than its median; otherwise 0. CODEQUAL is quality of Code 
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Compliance, measured as the number of ‘hard’ disclosures in the investor’s Code compliance 
statement related to the seven principles outlined in the Code. Disclosures are classified as 
‘hard’ if they are objective and verifiable. CODEQUAL1 is the quality of Code compliance 
dummy variable, coded 1 if CODEQUAL is larger than its median; otherwise 0. 
INVDUR*CODECOMP1, INVSIZE*CODECOMP1, INVDUR*CODEQUAL1 and 
INVSIZE*CODEQUAL1 are interaction terms, and the coefficients of these interactions 
indicate with every unit increase in 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑡 and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡, the effect of compliance with 
the Code and better Code disclosure quality made by institutional investors on earnings 
management. BDSIZE is board size, measured as the number of directors. BDIND is board 
independence, measured as the number of non-executive directors on the board divided by the 
total number of directors. GROWTH is book to market ratio, measured as total assets minus 
total liabilities divided by the market capitalization. LEV is leverage ratio, measured as total 
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liabilities divided by total assets. AGE is company age, measured as the number of years that 
the company has been founded; ROA is return on assets, measured as net income divided by 
total assets; Industry classifications include consumer staples, industrials, energy, information 
technology, healthcare, consumer discretionary, materials, telecommunication services and 
utilities. 
 
 
 
 
 137 
 
4.7 Summary 
In summary, institutional investors with longer 
investment duration and larger investment size can help 
constrain earnings management of their investee firms. 
However, the first hypothesis in this thesis of an 
enhanced positive relation between Code compliant 
longer investment duration institutional investors and 
investee firms’ earnings quality is not supported by the 
results. Similarly, this study finds no evidence supporting 
the second hypothesis that the positive relation between 
institutional investment size is stronger if institutional 
investors comply with the Code. Therefore, the overall 
conclusion is that Code compliance by institutional 
investors does not strengthen the influence of institutional 
investors on investee companies such that they obtain a 
higher quality of reported earnings. A Code disclosure 
quality index is constructed and presents the Code 
compliance situation in detail, with an acceptable 
reliability of 85 per cent. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the study and findings 
 
This study empirically examined whether compliance 
with the UK Stewardship Code by institutional investors 
would have a positive effect on the earnings quality of 
investee companies. It was assumed that Code 
compliance by institutional investors would enhance 
monitoring of investee companies’ accounting activities 
and result in a higher quality of reporting earnings. The 
McNichols (2002) version of the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model is applied to measure overall accruals 
quality, and the technique suggested by Francis et al. 
(2005) is applied to calculate the discretionary accruals 
quality. 
Regression models were used to test the association 
between institutional investors and earnings quality using 
measurement of discretionary accruals quality as the 
dependent variable. Consistent with prior studies, 
evidence was found that institutional investors’ 
investment duration and investment size were positively 
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related to earnings quality. In order to answer the 
research question, regression analyses with interaction 
terms for code compliance and code compliance quality 
were conducted. However, the results did not show that 
institutional investor compliance with the Code 
strengthened the positive relation between investment 
duration and size on investee company earnings quality. 
 
5.2 Discussion on possibilities of the Code non-
effectiveness 
 
Examination of the association between Code 
compliance by institutional investors and levels of 
investee earnings management did not reveal significant 
results, which is consistent with the prediction made by 
prior researchers that adoption of the Code is unlikely to 
have a transformative impact on institutional investors’ 
engagement in corporate governance (Cheffins, 2010; 
Roach, 2011; Arsalidou, 2012; Reisberg, 2015). This 
result may be the consequence of deficiency in the Code 
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itself, the passive nature of UK shareholders, or other 
limitations of the conduct of this study.   
According to commentary on the Code, deficiency of 
the Code is possible in three areas. The first area stems 
from the domestic focus and lack of comprehensive 
coverage of the Code (Cheffins, 2010; Roach, 2011; 
Arsalidou, 2012). Coverage of the Code is limited to UK 
institutional investors in listed companies. However, less 
than one-third of the ordinary shares in the UK are held 
by domestic institutional investors, and almost half of all 
shares are held by foreign investors. Cheffins (2010, 
p1020) provides analysis that suggests that ‘the 
fragmentation of share ownership in the UK stands out as 
a major stumbling block to activism by the mainstream 
institutional investors and may be reducing the investors’ 
sense of responsibility’, thus weakening the Code’s 
usefulness as a corporate governance mechanism. 
Another potential shortcoming of the Code is the comply-
or-explain model (Cheffins, 2010; Arsalidou, 2012). This 
flexible compliance approach means institutional 
investors could fail to regard compliance as a priority 
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(Cheffins, 2010). A further issue that can limit the 
effectiveness of the Code is that it fails to meet the 
criteria of establishing ‘a set of high quality and forward-
looking engagement principles’ (Roach, 2011, p.493). 
Even the Financial Reporting Council itself has 
commented that many statements in the Code to guide 
investor practices could be improved (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2014). 
The effectiveness also depends on whether activism 
by institutional investors is regarded as beneficial. The 
idea that shareholders with responsibility should play a 
positive role in reforming UK corporate governance 
should not be taken for granted (Cheffins, 2010). 
Obstacles to their playing a positive role are insufficient 
expertise of institutional investors, a preference not to be 
‘locked in’ by policies or interventions, and the cost and 
inconvenience associated with activism (Sullivan, 2010). 
Moreover, fund managers normally focus on trading 
decisions rather than act as owners. Additional concerns 
about shareholder activism stem from the passive nature 
of some institutional investors, as they are generally 
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disinterested in monitoring their companies (Reisberg, 
2015). 
However, the results of this study cannot be fully 
explained even by assuming a degree of deficiency in 
both the tenets of the Code and its execution by 
institutional investors. Several limitations of the study 
itself may have impacted the results. First, the sample 
size of this study may not be sufficiently large enough. It 
is limited to FTSE 100 companies and studied 103 
institutional investors in total, which is a small percentage 
of the 300 or so companies that have indicated some 
degree of Code compliance (according to the Financial 
Reporting Council). In addition, the time frame of the 
study is short, which means the Code may not have yet 
been completely integrated by investor companies. It 
should also be recognised that the earnings quality 
measure used in this study is inefficient at measuring 
discretionary accruals quality.  
This study finds that there is no significant 
association between Code compliance and quality of 
reported earnings, which is just one measure of corporate 
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performance that could be influenced by investor 
companies. Accounting ability is important but not the 
only measurement of shareholder’s monitoring 
effectiveness. 
Lastly, although institutional investors were defined 
and studied according to their investment size and 
investment durations in this study, classification should 
not be limited to these two categories. Institutional 
investors can also be categorised and investigated 
according to their investment asset objectives such as 
banks, mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, 
endowments, insurance companies, private equity funds 
and wealth funds. Qiu (2006) adopted this method of 
classification and found that large pension fund 
shareholders were effective monitors.  
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5.3 Discussion of endogeneity problem  
 
The problem of endogeneity is common in corporate 
governance studies (Brown et al, 2011; Roberts and 
Whited, 2012; Gippel et al., 2015), and is of concern 
regarding econometric tests of the hypotheses for this 
study. Endogeneity problems may arise if earnings 
quality and Code compliance are jointly determined or if 
omitted variables lead to spurious results. The scope of 
this thesis does not extend to addressing endogeneity 
concerns. Options available for addressing endogeneity 
include using instrumental variables. An alternative is to 
exploit circumstances that make a natural experiment 
possible (Gippel et al., 2015). This may be possible in the 
circumstances of the current study, as introduction of the 
UK Stewardship Code is not related to the incidence of 
earnings management by investee companies. 
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5.4 Implications and further research 
 
Limitations of this study provide opportunities for 
further research. Firstly, the sample can be extended to 
FTSE 200 or 300 and the sample time frame could be 
extended. Secondly, alternative measures of earnings 
quality or earnings management could be used, such as 
the Jones (1991) model. Thirdly, how risk is monitored 
and assessed, and how firm performance is optimized, 
can be investigated as alternative indicators of corporate 
governance when examining the effectiveness of the 
Code. Lastly, Code compliance by different types of 
institutional investors could be classified according to 
ownership type. 
This study has academic implications. The findings 
of this thesis offer some insight regarding the role of 
institutional investors in constraining earnings 
management. Institutional investors are a complex group 
with diverse types of financial institutions, and they 
should be analysed with multiple dimensions regarding 
monitoring activities in future research.  
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This study also has implications for practitioners and 
policymakers. It meets the need for research to test the 
efficacy of policy decisions that result in implementation 
of corporate governance codes. Policymakers may pay 
attention to the present study in terms of the information 
it provides regarding the enhancement of institutional 
investors’ engagement with investee companies. This 
study also provides empirical evidence that raises 
questions regarding the effectiveness of a comply-or-
explain model. Policymakers may also need to consider 
compliance regulation when revising the existing Code.
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Appendix  
Krippendorff's Alpha Reliability Estimate 
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                    Alpha    LL95%CI    UL95%CI      Units   
Observrs      Pairs  
Ordinal      .8509      .7269         .9492      51.0000     
2.0000    51.0000  
Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least 
alphamin:  
  alphamin          q  
      .9000         .7983  
      .8000         .1774  
      .7000         .0087  
      .6700         .0034  
      .6000         .0001  
      .5000         .0000  
Number of bootstrap samples: 10000 
Judges used in these computations: OBS1     OBS2  
Observed Coincidence Matrix 
10.0 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .0
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0 0 
.00 6.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 .00 .00 
.0
0 
.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 .00 
1.0
0 
.0
0 
.00 
1.00 2.00 1.00 
16.0
0 
2.0
0 
.0
0 
1.00 .00 
.00 1.00 .00 2.00 
16.0
0 
1.0
0 
.0
0 
.0
0 
.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 
18.0
0 
1.00 .00 
.00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 2.00 
.0
0 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
4.0
0 
Expected Coincidence Matrix 
1.09 
1.2
0 
.87 
2.5
0 
2.
1
2.29 .44 .44 
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8 
1.20 
1.0
9 
.87 
2.5
0 
2.
1
8 
2.29 .44 .44 
.87 .87 .55 1.82 1.58 1.66 .32 .32 
2.50 
2.5
0 
1.82 
5.
01 
4.55 4.78 .91 
.9
1 
2.18 
2.1
8 
1.58 
4.
55 
3.76 4.16 .79 .79 
2.29 
2.2
9 
1.66 
4.
78 
4.16 4.16 .83 .83 
.44 .44 .32 .91 .79 .83 
.1
6 
.
1
2 
Delta Matrix 
.00 
121.
00 
420.
25 
1296
.00 
330
6.25 
6084
.00 
8190
.25 
8930
.25 
121. .00 90. 625 2162 4489 6320 6972
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00 25 .00 .25 .00 .25 .25 
420.
25 
90.2
5 
.00 
240.
25 
1369
.00 
3306
.25 
4900
.00 
5476
.00 
1296
.00 
625.
00 
240.2
5 
.00 
462.
25 
1764
.00 
2970
.25 
3422
.25 
3306
.25 
2162
.25 
1369
.00 
462
.25 
.00 
420.
25 
1089
.00 
1369
.00 
6084
.00 
4489
.00 
3306
.25 
176
4.00 
420.
25 
.00 
156.
25 
272.
25 
8190
.25 
6320
.25 
4900
.00 
297
0.25 
1089
.00 
156
.25 
.0
0 
16
.0
0 
8930
.25 
6972
.25 
547
6.00 
3422
.25 
1369
.00 
272.
25 
16.
00 
.0
0 
Rows and columns correspond to following unit values 
.00 1.00 
2.0
0 
3.00 4.00 
5.0
0 
6.00 7.00 
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Note: After run commands KALPHA judges = 2/level = 
2/detail = 1/boot = 1000, the alpha value obtained is 
0.8509, which is an acceptable reliability level. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
